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Glossary 
 
AER General Energy Council (Algemene Energieraad) 
ET  Emissions Trading 
EU  European Union 
CC  Climate Change 
CEE Central and Eastern Europe 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CHP Combined Heat and Power 
CO2-eq.  CO2 equivalent 
COP Conference of Parties 
DC  Developing Country 
FCCC Framework Convention on Climate Change 
FM Flexibility Mechanisms 
GHG Greenhouse Gas 
GNP Gross National Product 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
JI  Joint Implementation 
KM Kyoto Mechanism 
KP  Kyoto Protocol 
KPFCCC Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC 
MS Member States 
NGO Non-governmenta l; Organisation 
PV  Photo-Voltaic  
RIVM  National Institute of Public Health and the Environment  
R&D Research and Development 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
US  United States of America 
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1. Introduction 
The Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) was requested by the General Energy 
Council (Algemene Energieraad -AER) to execute a research project on the international 
views on post-Kyoto climate policy implementation. The research project is to provide a 
background paper for the AER in its preparation of a post-Kyoto advice to the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. 
The research project focuses on identifying the international views on post-Kyoto cli-
mate policy (after 2010) within the perspective of the coming AER advice. The possibil-
ity of developing a no-regrets strategy in relation to climate change policy implementa-
tion focussing on the preparations for the period after 2010 and thus the question on what 
actions have to be taken in the short-term (e.g. 2003) to facilitate long-term (after 2010) 
climate policy development is analysed. In accordance with the AER starting note “post-
Kyoto” (AER, 2001) the 2002-2010 period is considered as a time basis for policy and 
investment decisions that effect the 2002-2030 period. The coherence between technolo-
gies and instruments is addressed. However, the research project will not give a technical 
blueprint of technologies that should be implemented for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The following research questions are central to the research carried out: 
“What is the range of short-term policy options for promoting technological and institu-
tional change at the national level given different scenarios of medium and long-term 
climate policy? To what extent are the identified policy options dependent on interna-
tional and/or European policy? Which of these options are robust, feasible and compati-
ble with different scenarios of medium and long-term climate policy?” 
The research project used two approaches for presenting an overview of the different 
views on post-Kyoto climate policy implementation. First, 10 experts with a clear vision 
on the future, a pronounced opinion and strategic insight were interviewed by telephone. 
The experts come from the NGO, industry, negotiation and science communities. The 
experts selected thus covers a selection of the diverse views amongst influential and es-
teemed experts in the world. Second, the results of the post-Kyoto workshops held be-
fore September 2001 were addressed and third the available literature on the research 
topic was reviewed to fill as much as possible the gaps that remain and providing a per-
spective to the interviews. The key interview questions are presented in Appendix I. It 
should be noted that the majority of the interviews were held prior to September 11 2001 
and thus do not reflect the impact of the latest events on international co-operation. 
The ‘ideal-typical’ scenarios for the future presented in Table 1 have been used as a basis 
for the research. These scenarios include ‘opposite’ assumptions on the future changes in 
climate and the level of consensus over international co-operation in the world. In the 
‘climate change high’ assumption the actual and perceived changes in climate in the 
2002-2010 period will be rapid with high visual damages and scientific and social con-
sensus on a high risks to human and natural systems will be established. In the ‘climate 
change low’ assumption climate will change slowly in the 2002-2010 period with little 
visual damages and scientific and social consensus on a low risks to human and natural 
systems will be established. In the ‘low consensus over co-operation’ assumption there 
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will be no consensus on international climate change policy amongst the Parties of the 
UNFCCC and the gap between the EU, the US and the rest of the world will widen. In 
the ‘high consensus over co-operation’ assumption there will be solidarity amongst all 
Parties to the UNFCCC and a high level of consensus on international climate policy. 
Table 1 Four potential scenarios for the development of the regime. 
 Consensus over co-operation 
High 
Consensus over co-operation  
Low 
Climate change (high) Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Climate change (low) Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
 
Different policy measures are possible in each scenario. Some of these measures will be 
taken in any case because of other driving forces in society (autonomous measures 
spurred on by issue-linkages to e.g. oil crises, local pollution, implementation of other 
treaties like the Biodiversity convention). Some measures will have to be promoted by 
the government. It will be analysed whether policy options are robust (i.e. that they are 
compatible with different policy scenarios) or if they are likely to be autonomous. The 
possible relationship with the domestic measures and international co-operation will be 
identified. Finally the stakeholder views on the pace of emission reduction and the asso-
ciated trends in global average GHG concentration levels will be addressed.  
Chapter 2 first describes the past and current international climate change policy negotia-
tions to give a background to the research. Then some issues for the post-Kyoto climate 
policy future are discussed. Chapter 3 presents transcripts from the interviews with 10 
experts on climate change and related issues. Chapter 4 gives a synthesis of the inter-
views, workshops and literature before the final chapters give summaries in both English 
and Dutch.
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2. Background to the climate change policy 
implementation process 
2.1 Past and current international climate change policy negotiations 
Ten years of negotiations on the climate change issue have led to the adoption, ratifica-
tion and entry into force of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and of the adoption of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC 
(KPFCCC). The negotiations at The Hague in November 2000 broke down because there 
was no consensus on the issues of the modalities of the flexibility mechanisms (the defi-
nition of sinks, supplementarity, etc.), compliance, and the funding mechanisms. 
A first step towards consensus on relaxed modalities of the flexibility mechanisms was 
reached in Bonn in July 2001. However, it is still uncertain whether enough nations will 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol (KP) enabling it to enter into force now the US decided to go in 
different direction from the rest of the world. The US argues that developing countries 
are not taking any action and have no obligations. However, China, India and South Af-
rica – the largest of the emitters in the South – are taking action. While President George 
W. Bush is opposed to ratification and the US senate had declared in 1997 its opposition, 
the majority is now in the hands of the Democrats and there is increasing public pressure 
on Bush not to alienate his foreign allies and his domestic public. As the former Chair of 
the EU negotiations states: ‘It is the US that is isolating itself and not the rest of the 
 
The agreement reached in Bonn and the steps already initiated in relation to Joint Im-
plementation (JI), Emission Trading (ET) and the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) indicate that there is a momentum in society to try and push matters further. 
2.2 Beyond Kyoto 
Several key questions regarding Kyoto and beyond are being addressed by a number of 
international workshops being organised this year in amongst others the UK (by the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs), in Germany (by Hamburg University) and in the 
Netherlands (by the Institute for Environmental Studies; by the Royal Dutch Academy of 
Sciences).  
One may argue that the possible future of post Kyoto policies (after 2012) depends more 
on global trends such as population growth, globalisation, liberalisation, the spread of 
communication technology, etc. In fact there is probably no such thing as a bus iness-as-
usual scenario where futures can be based on projections from existing steps. This led 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scenario developers to take a 
new approach. They developed four possible future scenarios. The first scenario (A1) as-
sumes rapid economic growth, low population growth, rapid growth of modern tech-
nologies and convergence in different regions of the world. The second scenario (A2) as-
sumes a heterogeneous world with widely diverging circumstances in different parts of 
the world. The third scenario (B1) assumes a convergent world but with more emphasis 
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on services and information and a socially, environmentally and economically equitable 
and sustainable global society. The fourth scenario (B2) focuses on local and regional 
solutions, a diversity of technological change, moderate population and moderate eco-
nomic growth. For each of these possible future worlds, many scenarios about the future 
were developed. In all scenarios it is possible to reduce greenhouse gas emissions but the 
impacts on society will be different (IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios, 2000).  
One can assume that if the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, the next steps will be deve l-
oping quantitative and qualitative commitments for the second and following commit-
ment periods for different groups of countries. One can also expect that the flexibility 
mechanisms will be constantly refined and improved to ensure the environmental inte g-
rity of the regime. If the Protocol does not enter into force, then it is likely that the an-
nual meetings of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FCCC) will still lead to pressure in relation to national inventories and 
communications on policy options in relation to mitigation and adaptation. This will in-
evitably lead to additional pressure on governments to adopt domestic policies and 
measures. If flexible mechanisms are subsequently considered necessary, it is not incon-
ceivable that governments adopt a modified version of the Kyoto Protocol, which only 
includes the mechanisms. However the flexibility mechanisms do not work efficiently in 
the absence of quantitative targets and commitments. 
Against this background the following chapters focus on identification of the interna-
tional views on post-Kyoto climate policy implementation. 
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3. Interviews 
This chapter presents the transcripts of interviews held with 10 international experts on 
climate change and climate change related issues. The interviews present the views of 
the experts as they emerged during the interview and, apart from the common starting 
point of the implementation of the current Kyoto Protocol, there is no particular order of 
the topics discussed. It should also be stressed that the interviewees were asked to give 
their personal opinion on the issues raised, and not that of their respective organisations. 
Before the interviews were held the interviewees were sent a background paper on the 
research and the interview questions for preparation. The interviews are presented in al-
phabetical order. 
 
Baumert, Kevin  
Research Fellow, World Resources Institute, USA 
The future of the current KP depends on the positioning of the US and Japan, but might 
also be more dependent on Russia than previously thought. If the US stays out then there 
might be good chances for ratification. Ratification by the end of 2002 is plausible, but 
only if the US stays out. US domestic actions will also help the international efforts. 
International ET with links to domestic programs will emerge amongst KP countries. 
Eventually, there will also be domestic ET in the US. The prospects are dim for JI, and 
even more so for CDM. Nevertheless, CDM will be helped by domestic actions in the 
US, but at the moment there is too much slack and too weak incentives in the current 
CDM system. The momentum for ET has been building for years and is seen as more in-
teresting for both business and government than taxation. These efforts will also all be 
linked to energy efficiency and energy sector reform.  
The transport sector will be key to achieve GHG emission reductions. The sector is the 
fastest growing in most countries. New engine technology, including hybrid fuel cells, 
hydrogen storage and conversion devices will have to be explored. There must also be 
more investment and attention towards sequestration. Energy efficiency measures and re-
form of the power sector will also come about. Investments in renewables are both likely 
and vital. PV and biomass will have to attract public subsidies.  
The prospects for nucle ar energy are not good. The economy of the technology does not 
work and requires public subsidies. These subsidies will be hard to get for a technology 
that does not have public support. 
The measures mentioned above are not really dependent on internationa l agreements. 
Energy efficiency, tax reform and reform of the power sector can be undertaken for non-
climate reasons. Policies are more likely to be developed if they have more than one in-
centive. Specific examples of this are topics on land use change that will also benefit 
farmers. 
Scenario 3 is the most likely, then 4, 1 and 2 for a 10-15 year time horizon. There will 
not be any catastrophic events that will determine the future of the climate regime. There 
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is no ‘ozone hole for climate change’ or any other scientific evidence that would directly 
spur immediate action. Concern for the climate will increase over the next 10 years. If it 
would be possible to pick ‘medium’ climate change this would be most correct. One 
must not forget that we have the UNFCCC. The momentum must be kept up. The 
framework we have provides a useful starting point but there are many concerns about 
co-operation and factors that will influence that. The willingness of countries to pay for 
mitigation and adaptation is an important factor. 
There are definite double benefits and linkages, such as in land use change and forestry. 
This will assist not only in tropical areas but also in areas of desertification. There is cer-
tainly potential for climate protection offsets to be used for biological diversity measures 
leveraged to make ecosystems healthier. There is a need for environmental criteria in the 
KP that go beyond simply CC measures.  
It is important that the US stay out of the first commitment period, but essential that they 
get back in for the second and following periods. The US will have to take the lead to 
achieve inclusion of DCs. There will be a need for a third group of countries, emerging 
from the existing non-Annex 1 countries. This group will most likely be made up of pro-
gressive and forward thinking countries that acknowledge the problems associated with 
CC, but who does not want to join Annex I. The rights and obligations in Annex I are in-
appropriate for DCs. One might instead see sectoral commitments and target indexes 
based on GNP. 
The argument of economic growth versus CC measures is an important consideration. If 
measures are perceived as costly they will never work. We need to be able to conceive 
CC measures as being good for the economy. Low cost measures must be pursued, but 
this will include a lot of measures, including a modest cap-and-trade system, technologi-
cal deve lopment programs, renewable energy subsidies, energy efficiency measures, and 
agricultural policies. We must start modestly and then grow when costs are revised. 
 
Grubb, Prof Michael  
Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine, UK 
It will be hard to backtrack after Bonn. There is 75% chance of EU ratification and 60% 
chance of full ratification by Johannesburg (2002). EU ratification will lead to Russian, 
and then Japanese, ratification. The US might try to derail the process. Few issues could 
upset Marrakech. The current US positioning towards the KP has unified everyone else. 
There is a diverse mix of policies and instruments that will be used for the first commit-
ment period. ET will clearly be used, taxation and industrial exemption will be used in 
some countries. Renewable policies, critique schemes and vehicle standards will also be 
important measures. The EU is already ahead on renewable energy policies and schemes. 
There will be an emergence of cleaner technologies in the US and maybe also a cap and 
trade system. The Japanese situation is difficult. Russia needs to stabilise its political 
framework to attract foreign investments. The KP will play an important role in Russian 
energy (and foreign) policies. Not many countries will meet their targets domestically. It 
can be questioned if they are willing to spend the resources needed to bridge the gap be-
tween domestic reductions and reductions achieved abroad. 
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Nobody knows about the 2nd commitment period. This will depend on the perceived suc-
cess/failure of the 1st commitment period. There will be a wider group of countries with 
commitments, possibly divided into blocks. US participation will be bound up to DC 
participation, and vice versa.  
A third criterion for the determination of future scenarios is the US approach to the cli-
mate regime. Expects that the US will be forced back into the protocol. Sees the reac-
tions in the US Congress to the Bonn agreement as a precursor to this. US leadership is 
seen as essential (in the US) and there are a ½ dozen bills coming forward. A broader 
debate on US isolationism is expected. Politically costs are too high if they stay outside, 
rules will be developed without them, and will move towards trade measurer. Multina-
tional companies will be tired of having to deal with different set of rules and will want 
credits for their actions also in the US. 
In Europe, renewables and natural gas, plus biomass linked to carbon sinks will emerge 
as energy solutions. There will be talk but no action on the issue of nuclear. This will be 
similar for sequestration. The issue of nuclear will vary between different DCs. Only a 
few DCs have the capacity to invest in nuclear, amongst these are China, and maybe 
South-Korea (if they should indeed be classified as a DC). Bonn has effectively ruled out 
credits for nuclear, so any new plants will face major difficulties unless some radical 
new nuclear technology emerges. 
In the US clean coal plus disposal and technology lead solutions will prevail.  
Energy efficiency measures are already in place in many (if not all) regions and these 
will be pursued and strengthened.  
Transport will not change unless fuel cells are used in a big way. There will be some 
shift towards high-speed trains, but mostly as a result of congestion and ‘need for speed’. 
No major technological (or energy) breakthroughs are expected in the near future. A hy-
drogen economy with a decentralised energy system could emerge. A large growth in the 
use of biomass is expected. 
Added benefits will not only be seen in relation to other environmental problems, but 
will also be seen through industrial leadership. This hinges on technological processes 
and their progress. Costs will be short term but their benefits will be long term. Expects 
forest conservation to be wrapped up in the KP. 
High levels of international co-operation are expected, but it is difficult to predict the 
level of climate change in the future. A reasonable pros pect will be doubling of concen-
trations with a peak in 10-20 years. 
If there is no agreement there will be a patchwork of measures, with a more intensified 
program in the case of an agreement. Action in DCs and Russia depends on international 
agreements.  
Arguments on impact on national economic growth from climate change related meas-
ures are not valid. The cost of CC measures will amount to 0.1-0.2% of GNP, maybe 
higher for some countries. This will be outweighed by more strategic innovation and less 
use of resources. 
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Hare, Bill  
Climate Policy Director, Greenpeace International 
The KP is expected to come into force in 2002/3, although without US participation. Ne-
gotiations on the second commitment period, US re-entry and possible DC entry, plus 
some additional obligations under the KP, will take place sometime after 2004. The rati-
fication process has already started in many countries and the Bonn agreement supplies 
enough substance for this process to continue and for entry into force to become a reality 
within a year or so. 
All key parties apart from the US will ratify the KP and the next step will follow. A vari-
ety of instruments will be used to meet the obligations under the KP. ET on European 
level and EU programs on enhancement of renewable energies, including energy effi-
ciency standards and domestic programs on renewables will emerge. Energy taxation at 
EU level is also an option that will possibly emerge, and changes at the transport level 
within EU should be expected. 
Outside the EU, New Zealand will deal with their need to improve the energy efficiency 
of their economy and no further fossil options will be explored. No significant action is 
expected from Australia. Japan will actively use the KMs and introduce top-down rules 
for energy efficiency. Nothing is expected from Canada. 
Nuclear as an instrument to combat CC is a dead issue, although some countries (Japan 
mentioned) will push for increased use of nuclear energy. Public opinion dictates that no 
further nuclear plants will be built, especially as they will remain excluded from JI and 
CDM. There might be discussions on the use of nuclear in several countries, UK, Swe-
den, Germany mentioned, and although there is strong opposition to the use of nuclear 
energy, the existing installations will not be replaced in the immediate future. 
Massive innovations on energy solutions are expected within the next 50 years, but it is 
hard to predict which way the energy systems will develop. Fuel cell technologies are al-
ready being introduced and will be used at household levels shortly in Germany. A hy-
drogen society is most definitely an option, and there are several routes to reach the po-
tential for hydrogen. The only question is how. Biomass fuels have a large technical po-
tential for use in the future. There are some technical limitations that will have to be 
overcome, but biomass energy is currently an underused option that will be given more 
focus in the future. Photovoltaic will play an increasingly important role, especially 
given the latest developments on (self)(re)generating organic photovoltaic cells. Large-
scale wind energy installations will also play an increasingly important role, but it is dif-
ficult to predict the final scale of the technology, as indeed it is with all the above-
mentioned technologies.  
The big discussion in the future will be the choice of the new energy carrier, and then 
especially what type of energy that will be utilised for transport purposes. 
CO2 extraction technologies are subject to substantial research, especially in the US, and 
there use might turn out important in the future. CO2 storage is increasingly controversial 
and will meet strong opposition from Greenpeace and other NGOs, whereas geological 
disposal is seen as ‘more OK’.  
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There are substantial added benefits of climate change measures, especially for land use 
and forestry. 
High levels of climate change are expected, which will result in increased international 
co-operation. Arguments from industry in such a scenario would probably be that it is 
too late to do anything about the problem and that efforts should be shifted towards 
adaptation and a gradual transition towards a 550-560 ppmv concentration. This attitude 
would of course change in the aftermath of direct climate catastrophes in rich countries.  
The concept of no-regret options is not valid. Admittedly energy efficiency and R&D 
can be seen as such, but the lack of action on these policies in the past shows a different 
view. If these options really were seen as no-regret options they would have been im-
plemented to a much higher degree already. No-regret policies are identified but polit i-
cians cut back on funding and implementation of these options often meet with oppos i-
tion when init iated. No-regret options constitute an ‘intellectual smoke screen’ and do 
not amount to anything substantial. 
Regardless of international co-operation there will be continuation of some programs and 
technology solutions. This progress will come about for different reasons, but most 
countries will not go ahead with their programs. The UK, Sweden, Germany and maybe 
the Netherlands are countries that are seen as progressive enough to continue their work 
regardless of international agreements. Nothing can be guaranteed at EU level. In the ab-
sence of an international agreement the leaders, Germany mentioned, will probably lose 
their interest and their leadership position might collapse. 
If there is a high level of economic growth then it will be easier to renew infrastructure, 
there will be larger replacement of capital, and the system might be self-regenerating. 
For DCs there might be a different dynamic, and failure of (energy and non-energy) 
technology solutions to repay their investments will result in a lock-in on fossil tech-
nologies.  
There will be binding emission limitations for groups of DCs. The differentiation be-
tween the DCs could not be done solely on per capita or GNP comparisons, but GNP per 
capita might be one of the parameters that will be used to set an important threshold for 
commitments to be undertaken, but the process will be more difficult and fuzzy than just 
that. There might be a revisit to the dropped Annex C with energy efficiency for finance.  
China and India are a long way from accepting any commitments, whereas Latin Ameri-
can countries might see the advantages of taking on commitments, especially given a fa-
vourable trading system. Some countries in Southeast Asia might follow swiftly.  
DC participation will of course be dependent on the perception and reality of US partic i-
pation. The KP must be in force, with some leve l of US participation, to ensure DC par-
ticipation. 
The commitments for the developed world will have to be substantially improved (i.e. 
larger reductions) for the second and later commitment periods. 
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Junfeng, Li  
Director, Energy Research Institute, China 
There are good chances for the Kyoto Protocol (KP). The protocol is well liked and there 
is enough will to achieve reductions even without the USA and Japan. It is very unclear 
when entry into force will take place. EU and other countries, including developing na-
tions, will pull forward to make the KP become a reality in the near future. 
Policy instruments such as CDM will give financial incentives for both the deve loped 
world and DCs. Business and industry must also be involved to make the system func-
tion well. JI is a good idea but CDM will prove more important.  
The criteria suggested for the determination of future scenarios are good. Other criteria 
that could be included are how the protocol/programs is promoted and how easy it is to 
understand (transparency).  
International co-operation must be given incentives through identification of the most 
important priorities. CDM and business based co-operation needs knowledge to indicate 
where and how to move forward. The win-win situations need to be clearly identified 
and presented. 
Energy solutions are important, especially energy efficiency measures and renewable en-
ergy. These options are no-regret options and will also have added benefits. The use of 
these energy measures will open up a lot of business, and it is important to have clear 
targets for the use of these measures, but these do not necessarily have to be climate re-
lated. 
Nuclear energy is a very powerful technology (yields large amounts of electricity) and 
will be important in the short term (up to 2050) until renewable energy has been deve l-
oped and commercialised. There will be a significant role for renewable energy in the 
long term but it needs substantial R&D.  
Added benefits: solar and wind energy will directly benefit poverty alleviation as these 
energy sources can supply energy to areas where there is no infrastructure for larger en-
ergy options. These benefits will mainly be local and will also include environmental 
benefits. 
It will be difficult to establish the magnitude of CC in the short term, as this evidence 
will need to be collected over a longer term. International co-operation will of course de-
pend on the significance of CC but it is difficult to establish now how this will be viewed 
in the future. 
Domestic energy efficiency policie s and actions, including the use of renewable energy 
sources and also some nuclear will take place regardless of the level of co-operation. If 
there is international agreement and a high level of co-operation then these measures will 
be introduced much faster. The use of renewable energy will be given incentives through 
international co-operation and financial and economic support. China and India will 
emerge as hot spots for the use of renewable energy. 
The link between economic growth and climate related measures needs more research. It 
will be very difficult to establish where the optimal point of policy implementation is 
(the point where measures do not compromise economic growth). 
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Second and later commitment periods: the most important question for DCs is what the 
developed world is doing, and then especially the EU and US. To wait for DCs to take 
commitments would be a waste of time. Financial and development support will be im-
portant commitments to undertake for the developed nations. Technology transfer and 
financial support will be increasingly important, especially under CDM, and it is impor-
tant to have a money flow from the developed world to the lesser-developed world. 
 
Kimura, Kotara  
Director, Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute, Japan 
Parties can reach enough agreement to start their ratification process at COP7. However, 
it may take longer time than expected to conclude necessary policies within each gov-
ernment that enables ratification. Russia will finally ratify KP, but it might take slow 
start. In addition, US approach to climate change is still uncertain. Since US is in a very 
comfortable position from industries' competitiveness viewpoint, this aspect may have 
some influence over each government decision. Taking these factors into account, early 
entry into force of KP, at least in 2002 seems unrealistic, even if it becomes effective. 
What approach US will take on climate change is a key to the fate of KP. US involve-
ment is indispensable from both environmental and economic perspectives. Without 
meaningful US participation, developing countries' involvement can never be expected. 
We have to make all efforts in order to bring US back into the process. Although there is 
a new movement including both Republicans and Democrats within US Congress, US 
new approach remains to be seen. Therefore, it is too premature to make any prediction 
on the future of KP, not to speak of 2nd commitment period and beyond. 
Concerning nuclear energy, one thing must be clarified: Japan relies on imports for about 
80% of its energy consumption. 80% excludes nuclear energy. The dependency will rise 
to over 90% without it. Unlike Europe and US, grids and pipelines are not connected 
with foreign countries. Therefore, nuclear energy is very important both to combat cli-
mate change and secure energy supply. In formulating policies, each country's circum-
stances must be respected. Nuclear energy will play a meaningful role at least until mid-
dle of this century.  
Under any scenario, technology transfers to deve loping countries and R&D on innova-
tive technologies are best no-regret policies. Environment friendly and efficient tech-
nologies should be transferred to developing countries through as many channels as pos-
sible, including CDM, if KP becomes effective. Concerning innovative technologies, 
both technologies to reduce CO2 emission and sequester CO2 are to be pursued. Re-
cently, advisory body to Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry issued a short report 
that deals with these technologies. International colla boration is strongly recommended. 
The future of the climate regime is dependent upon the US approach to the problem. If 
the US is out of the solution then it will be nonsense to continue the protocol, both for 
environmental and economic reasons.  
In the future there will be commitments made by the developing countries although these 
will take a different form than for Annex I countries. A gross target for the developing 
countries is expected. The Annex I targets will also be renegotiated, with lower targets 
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for Japan, where a per capita approach might be considered a useful tool. In general, it is 
hard to establish what these new targets will be or how they will be negotiated. 
 
Minett, Dr Simon  
Cogen Europe 
The Bonn agreement is good and the process should start now. The Americans will come 
on board eventually. The agreement is weaker than the original. The EU is expected to 
ratify in 2002 with other countries following swiftly. Entry into force is expected from 
2003. Carbon prices will be low in the early phases, which will only stimulate cheaper 
options. 
As for future agreements things will get a lot tighter. The reduction targets we have now 
are totally inadequate. To meet a situation where anthropogenic impacts on the climate 
are sustainable we need a reduction in the order of –15% to –80%. There will be a defi-
nite deepening of the targets over the next 10 years. A better scientific understanding of 
the problem will result in higher levels of international co-operation. The future will 
show that the costs associated with the reductions are not as high as some forecast. The 
experiences from the BP and Shell internal ET schemes can be used to prove this point.  
With the renewable and cogeneration targets and directives and other already initiated 
programs EU will meet the targets for the first commitment period. There are, however, 
questions about the political will that need to be answered.  
DC targets must come but the US approach to this situation is much too arrogant and al-
most colonial in its nature. By the 2nd commitment period the DCs will have to come 
aboard. Differentiation of the DCs is inevitable. 
The level of CC in the future is difficult to establish at the moment. Single events might 
be more important than long-term trends for establishing politic al will. Consensus on the 
scie ntific understanding of the problems will trigger higher levels of international co-
operation and this will again lead to an understanding of higher levels of CC. The IPCC 
is doing an enormous amount of good work on this issue. 
The recently finalised EU CC program with multi-stakeholder consultation gives good 
indications on where the EU will focus their efforts in the future. ET in EU and a whole 
raft of other policies and measures will emerge. These are being ranked according to cost 
effectiveness criteria. There is an enormous scope for doing things at low costs. For in-
stance, CHP costs a lot of money, but the level of taxation or other economic instruments 
do not need to meet the costs as carbon costs of € 3-4 per ton will trigger the introduction 
of CHP, even though this is a process that will most often be introduced anyway. Energy 
efficiency can be improved by 20-40%, cogeneration can account for 20-30% of all en-
ergy usage, and renewables 20%. These measures will have various degrees of cost-
effectiveness but will be more cost-effective than other options like nuclear and carbon 
sequestration, which have hidden costs disguised as subsidies. This means that we can 
cut 20% of 65% of the total emissions without compromising cost effectiveness. In that 
respect the timetable for implementation of these measures is more important. There is a 
large volume of investments needed to meet these targets, and the longer we wait the 
harder it will be to reach them. Capacity- and personnel limitations are major obstacles. 
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Some might consider nuclear energy as an option, but the use of nuclear energy is not 
valid for several reasons. This can be seen from both a cost effectiveness viewpoint with 
hidden costs disguised as subsidies, and from the understanding that nuclear energy is 
‘emotionally not wanted’. Will nuclear be accepted if we experience high levels of CC? 
No. The technology will not be accepted either in the EU nor the US. Nuclear is an engi-
neering solution that does not fit the model of the world. If nuclear emerges as a solution 
in DCs there will be a whole new array of problems that will have to be dealt with.  
As for technological innovations in the future the Cool Europe project has identified two 
paths: biomass dominated energy supply (35% of total supply), and wind and solar en-
ergy based supply. In the latter there will be a need for an energy carrier for the surplus. 
This might be hydrogen based but there are several constraints on hydrogen technology, 
such as societal and technical constraints, as well as significant on-costs for transforma-
tion. This transformation might be easier in the transport sector.  
Fossil fuel refining (stripping) and disposal is just a technical quick fix.  
It will be important to introduce proper standards on energy use, as we already see in the 
energy sector. A phasing out of power generation could be used to achieve this. The set-
ting of energy standards on appliances and cars could also be transferred to power sta-
tions. The standards could be put as carbon efficiency, age, or efficiency. By tightening 
the targets over time there would be a gradual phasing out of the most polluting stations 
and processes. This will open space for renewables and cogeneration. This measure 
should also be introduced for cars and appliances on a larger (EU) scale. 
Notes that the Commission is willing to go down this (and other) routes, but that Me m-
ber States (MS) are more sceptical. With increased levels of CC we will see more MS 
participation, and we might have a shift from the traditional north-south EU divide into 
an east-west divide. Then again, the CEE countries might surprise us all. 
The implementation of CC measures will not compromise economic growth. On the con-
trary, a move towards more sustainable technologies will stimulate technological deve l-
opment and create a whole new market that will contribute to the economy. Cogenenera-
tion, renewables and energy efficiency measures are all good for the economy, whereas 
end-of-pipe solutions are purely costs. Climate relate d measures might affect the econ-
omy when we go deeper (larger reduction targets) but new economies might emerge. 
The US approach, that CC related measures might destroy the economy, is not a valid 
argument. 
As for policy instruments or approaches it is recommended that MSs should come up 
with targets (either carbon or efficiency targets) that should be set through environmental 
policies (as energy policies will not allow for these changes under the Treaty). These tar-
gets will have to be set in a way such that governments will have to meet at least two 
targets within their term of office. This way we avoid the guilt being placed on previous 
administrations, the reluctance of passing legislation, and other person problems. Gov-
ernments are not good at long term planning. Perhaps the way to avoid this is to use in-
ternational treaties. Targets should be set also under these treaties (although not for the 
first commitment period of the KP). Targets should be annual or biannual, ensuring two 
milestones per parliament/term of office.  
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The Commission has to be more creative. Does not see changes in Treaty to include an 
energy chapter. There are upsides and downsides to this. We might see a change in atti-
tude over time, with increased co-operation between the Commission and the Parliament.  
CC measures will be taken as a result of a mix of incentives.  
Gas fired co-generation is an interim step towards a renewable future which will also in-
clude energy efficiency and cogeneration for renewables. It is difficult to see a zero fos-
sil economy emerging within the next 50-100 years. 
 
Moorcroft, Dave 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
The greatest importance of the current KP is as a catalyst rather than as an instrument. 
The way things have gone points to ratification by some countries but not entry into 
force. Implementation without ratification is also a possible outcome. The main problem 
of the current KP is that it sits within an expert arena; the general public and consumers 
at large are not informed about the issues. 
Ratification can be expected by a number of countries, at the World Summit at the earli-
est, followed by implementation measures to inform consumers. This will produce tangi-
ble outputs. A lot will also depend on how multilateral co-operation deve lops in light of 
the recent world events. The importance of multilateral co-operation is emerging, and the 
USA may place more importance on multi-lateral agendas. There will be a positive move 
towards a broader socio-economic agenda. The world and the political economy have 
changed, although the impact of changes on the climate change debate will take place at 
an uncertain pace and scale. 
The future of the climate protocols, the second and coming commitment periods, de-
pends on what happens in the next 2-3 years. There is a clear issue to deal with: estab-
lishing viable real long-term goals. We must deal with a number of uncertain and am-
biguous issues on a larger and longer scale. There must be a whole range of capacities 
for nations to meet their goals within this context. The KP is an important vehicle to 
build consumer awareness and in the short term it is important to see a price of carbon 
emerging. This will contribute greatly to an increased attention and inquiry into climate 
and energy issues by consumers at large. 
Without exception the biggest criticism from DCs is that the current KP is an exclusive 
device aimed at industrialised countries. Recognition of developing country performance 
is a big missing factor, and the focus on developed country targets is partly a cause of 
that. The issue with targets is how they are managed, and the transparency of how targets 
are established; the fact is that current targets are more the result of negotiation skills 
than fundamental issues. There must be more focus on recognition and results. Instead of 
having black and white targets there need to be more transparency. We should not worry 
too much about academic generated dilemmas, but instead look at long-term goals and 
aspirations. We must also tackle a conflict of va lues via a longer-term horizon. There are 
a lot of divides, both North-South and transatlantic. There must be realisation that what 
works in one place does not necessarily work in another.  
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The climate regime will have to include an increasing awareness of the broader socio-
economic agenda, which will be a fundamental driver in the future. Aspects that will be 
considered in the future includes resource use, population growth, wealth creation in 
DCs, are all examples of issues that are growing in prominence.  
Energy will increasingly come into focus for the next decade. This will also include is-
sues of diversification, access to markets, security of supplies, etc. These issues could be 
pushed into the right direction by the CC agenda. The diversification and range of tech-
nologies could gain greater importance. This could be of special importance to China 
and India. 
There are clear benefits from climate related measures within a more integrated ap-
proach, which will have a broader impact on a broader set of issues. The set of policies 
and instruments that we have at the moment are not integrated enough. We must strive to 
find complimentary solutions. One of the real barriers that must be overcome is the con-
flict of policies. Issues like water management, biodiversity, a whole range of develop-
ment issues, trade, security, and regional issues will all have to be considered in relation 
to climate measures.  
CC itself is not the best locus for driving policies. The development agenda will be pre-
dominant. If CC policie s are seen to block immediate human needs then it will be in-
creasingly difficult to introduce CC measures. If the current and future KPs are to suc-
ceed there must be an inclusion of development issues, and the protocol must be ‘taken 
ve paradigm of the developed countries.  
The drive towards a hydrogen society is emerging. A critical path will be the interim 
measures, including transformation of the distribution systems. The transport sector will 
be crucial, and interim measures with transport and vehicles will be very important driv-
ers. This will include more efficient vehicles, hybrids, and fuel cells on a commercial 
scale. These interim measures will lead to an infrastructure for a hydrogen-based econ-
omy. 
The key issue with renewable  energy will be to make these technologies significant in 
the developed world. One must look at how to deploy such technologies in developed 
countries in order to achieve the scale and critical mass to support cost effective deploy-
ment in the developing world. Potential drivers for this will be energy supply issues in-
cluding diversification and security of supplies. The KP can be a catalyst for getting 
these things off the ground and we must allow people and markets to experiment with a 
variety of policy measures and instruments. To achieve this it is crucial that a price of 
carbon is established. 
The life-cycle analysis of nuclear energy is well known and the technology is not viable 
on economic grounds alone. The choice of whether or not to use nuclear energy will be 
secondary to CC and will be chosen for other reasons. Nuclear energy is essentially a red 
herring in the current CC debate. If there is initial success in deploying renewables, the 
lower risks and lower capital costs will push nuclear to the background in the climate 
change debate. The cost and nature of the technology does not lend itself to a develop-
ment agenda in poorer economies with limited infrastructure and institutional capacity.  
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In the short to medium term it is essential that there is a whole spread of energy tech-
nologies present. The diversity of energy supply is important. If there is political will 
then governments could drive this agenda forward and stimulate markets. 
Scenario 2 is an insightful future scenario; high levels of impact from climate change 
with low levels of consensus on co-operation. This relationship depends on the extent 
that the public perceives a connection between weather events and climate change. This 
could be volatile, since equally the public might conclude that CC is not important if 
there are a few years of ‘good’ weather. This leads back to the point made previously 
that CC is more robustly addressed if it is fundamentally linked to a dimension of socio -
economic development, food, water, health, security, etc. 
Emissions trading will be very important in developing and understanding of ‘carbon’ as 
a valued commodity and getting society to put a price on emissions. There are very low 
risks involved with these measures but very high upside potentials.  
Joint Implementation is trading in all but name. There is a danger of dressing JI up too 
much. JI will be important for dealing with issues of hot air and transferring assigned 
amounts money in transparent ways. 
The Clean Development Mechanism is an ‘offshore’ supply of credits outside Annex I 
that has clear traction with the development agenda. The volume of credits will not be 
crucial in relation to CC, but will act as a good medium for aligning agendas and as a 
long-term capacity builder. There is real potential for CDM, but it will not generate sig-
nificant credits in the first commitment period. 
Sinks will play whatever role we give them. Geological sinks may be cost-effective in 
limited applications depending on the price of carbon, either in connection with existing 
oil and gas infrastructures through re-injection, or through finding suitable reservoirs. 
With biological sinks we need to learn by doing, and to use these in a measured way. 
The issue of biological sinks must be seen through a holistic approach to the biosphere 
and development. The issue must be managed well and we can then see where it takes 
us. There are clear natural constraints on sinks that will also have to be taken into ac-
count. 
The impact of climate related measures on the economy go back to our measures of eco-
nomic growth. The current measures of economic growth do not encompass criteria of 
sustainability and are not proper indicators of performance in this area. If we measure the 
impact of climate measures by neo-classical economics we can expect to see negative 
impacts. On the other hand, if it were measured in broader terms of performance, one 
would expect to see beneficial growth and positive impacts. Climate related measures 
would contribute to economic growth and development and act as a stimulus to innova-
tion. Costs, benefits and damages must be better quantified. 
When it comes to the pace of greenhouse gas emission reduction it will be a shot in the 
dark. There is a landscape of possibilities. By the end of the first commitment period we 
will probably meet 60% of the target. If we focus on the game rather than the scoreboard 
we could do better than the target. But this optimism falls off the closer to the commit-
ment period becomes and the longer the negotiations get bogged down in too much de-
tail and bureaucracy.  
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It is important that a number of countries start moving forwards. Peer comparison will be 
a great driver for CC actions and performance.  
 
Pachauri, Dr RK  
Director, Tata Energy Research Institute, India 
Vice Chair, IPCC 
The agreement reached in Bonn will lead to a watered down version of the KP. There are 
several questions that need to be clarified at COP7. Need to find a least common factor 
for all countries. Sinks and caps and other issues will be key issues for the coming nego-
tiations. The actual reductions that will be achieved through the watered down agreement 
will be in the region of 1% to 1.5% (from 1990 levels). The general agreement reached 
at Bonn and the continued work at COP7 will speed up the ratification process and entry 
into force might happen sometime in 2002. US partic ipation is not expected in the near 
future.  
The 2nd and the further commitment periods are difficult to predict. This will be highly 
dependent on the position of civil society, and then especially in the US. If the people 
perceive the CC regime as a part of international government that the US should partic i-
pate in, then there could be sufficient pressure on the government to join. The question 
of DC participation is difficult. There will be some kind of commitment, but no com-
mitments will be made on reductions. Commitments could be made on more carbon effi-
cient development; de-linking carbon from the economic growth, but no physical reduc-
tions would be accepted. As for the developed nations their commitments would have to 
be substantially more ambitious. Europe, and also possibly Japan, will take the lead. 
A high level of CC impacts is expected in the future. This will come about from the fact 
that nothing is done (reduction wise) to deal with the problem now. This is also pointed 
out in the findings of the third assessment report of the IPCC. The level of international 
co-operation will be low in the near future. It takes 3-4 years for the international com-
munity to absorb the assessment reports and a speeded up process cannot be expected 
until 2015. 
The future will see a more efficient use of energy. Especially the transport sector is key 
here. Pricing and taxation of energy will also be used in developed nations to deal with 
these issues. Europe and Japan are much more forward looking than the US on these is-
sues. A shift in the energy consumption and production patterns is expected, but not 
through any major technological breakthrough. The future of fuel cells remains to be 
seen, this also goes for the future use of renewables. Fuel cells, PV, more efficient bio-
mass systems, and small gas fired turbines will take up a niche market. The future will 
essentially be based on cleaner and more efficient technologies. 
Nuclear energy might receive a boost on parts of the world (US and Japan) in the future 
but will not be a favoured option in Europe and will not take up a large part in the worlds 
energy market. 
As for further measures and instruments the KMs will not play a major role in the near 
future and the scale that these mechanisms might have is doubtful. A key issue will be to 
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see how the money-flow from the north to the south will develop. The functioning of the 
new funds that are being introduced is questionable. 
No regret policies are abundant in existence. If people’s va lues and mindsets can be 
changed, then a lot more no regret options can be implemented. This must start in a big 
way in the US and Canada. A number of no regret options exist for Japan, and they are 
moving forward with energy efficie ncy. A lot is also happening is developing countries, 
but mainly for local reasons as opposed to global. There are also a number of no regret 
policies in Europe. States that people must be told about the no regret options, and they 
must believe in them, and this can best be done through a change of societal mindsets. 
The links between CC measures and added benefits and the KP and other protocols is 
still unclear. For the linkage of the protocols more co-ordination is important. A focused 
and efficient use of resources for implementation is necessary. Several areas of overlap 
can be identified: the Montreal Protocol, Certification, Biodiversity, and Forestry. There 
is an overlap in most agreements but there is absolute need for a system to deal with 
these overlaps. 
There is no conflict at all of climate-related measures and domestic economic growth. 
Local benefits need to be adequately quantified. In the end there will be no negative im-
pact on economic growth as a result of CC measures. 
 
Verbruggen, Prof dr. Harmen 
Director, Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) 
The current KP is not a well-defined international environmental agreement and will be 
very difficult to implement. The major problem with the KP is that the instruments with 
which the countries have to realise their emission reductions are not well defined. This 
includes the flexibility mechanisms, the EU bubble (which can also be seen as a flexibil-
ity mechanism), and the inclusion of sinks. 
It was a big mistake to first agree on the targets for GHG emission reductions and then to 
open the negotiation on the mechanisms. If you first define the reduction targets then 
conflicts of interests will affect the negotiations on the working of the mechanisms. The 
protocol should have been developed the other way around; first to get the mechanisms 
working, including implementation, monitoring and sanctions, and then to agree on tar-
gets. The political momentum has been to go for emission reduction targets and then to 
try to get their way out via the mechanisms. This is a very serious problem. 
The role of the different country groups is very complex. The role of the EU has not 
been very good. Countries like the USA and Japan agreed on targets whereas the EU 
created the bubble and then allocated their emissions reductions amongst the Member 
States. This acts as a kind of pre-emissions trading system and is a big frustration for 
other negotiation parties.  
If possible the negotiations should start all over again, or at least further elaborate on the 
functioning of the KP as it is at present. It is not advised to stop the process or not to rat-
ify the KP. Ratification should be followed by more emphasis on a well-designed system 
of mechanisms, monitoring and enforcement. Emission reductions could be postponed 
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for 2-4 years. Sinks should be skipped, as they are not credible. The reduction targets 
could also be renegotiated, as they are not credible at all at the moment. The main focus 
must be on credible instruments. The current KP is a bad start to a long process. 
There will be no ratification yet, as there is no proper agreement on Bonn. The Bonn 
agreement is vague and needs to take the form of a written agreement before the Bonn 
process is ended. National parliaments are not happy about the position of Canada and 
Japan or the new instruments that are designed for these countries.  
The likelihood of scenarios for the KP will be option d) and to a lesser extent option b). 
The GATT can be taken as an example for the future of the KP. The discussion of free 
trade started before the 2nd World War and the treaty to establish a world trade organisa-
tion was came about in 1947. The USA was not in favour of the treaty and congress op-
posed it. The treaty then took the form of simply asking countries to be party to the 
agreement, and 13 countries (12 after Czechoslovakia left soon after) agreed to this. At 
the time they only agreed on the rule of the game, then came a round on tariff and non-
tariff barriers. It took 50-60 years to reach the targets of the treaty. The lesson is that one 
must start with the forerunners and not include the back loggers.  
The last 5 years are basically lost on climate change. One should more or less start over 
again. This should not be called renegotiations but further elaboration. International col-
laboration on other issues might also be important for the KP. The current state of inter-
national politics, and possible future scenarios, will affect international strategic obje c-
tives, and also international environmental agreements.  
DCs should be taken seriously and included in the KP as soon as possible. They must be 
given something to join, but not only money and projects. DCs are sceptical towards 
CDM and are concerned about selling their cheapest options first. A system must be de-
veloped where it is attractive for DCs to participate. This might take the form of tradable 
permits or funds or others. It is a pre-condition to the KP that DCs join, and also that 
they are given clear targets. There must be participation by both developed and develop-
ing nations. 
The present KP targets are very modest because we didn’t define the mechanisms first. If 
we could agree on the mechanisms before agreeing on targets then –10% to -15% could 
be feasible by 2010, followed by a doubling every 10 years. This means that a 50% re-
duction by 2050 would be feasible. A precondition for this rate of reduction is that the 
mechanisms are properly defined and that there is a well functioning incentive system.  
We will see serious signs of climate change in the next 10 to 20 years. International co-
operation will be strengthened after 5 to 10 years as a result of these signs. It will take 5 
years to clean up the mess from the current KP. 
By 2050 we will have a well-functioning incentive system, properly defined mecha-
nisms, structures that resemble a quasi/pseudo market for GHGs, a partly operating ET 
which can be defined as a JI system, tradable permits or other systems with other names. 
The future will use a mix of different energy and technology solutions. Nuclear energy 
might re-emerge as a relevant option given its carbon free nature and the amount of 
R&D going into the technology at the moment. We might see smaller and safe nuclear 
plants, using other nuclear substances as their raw materials. The waste problem must be 
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solved but 40 years of technological development might solve this. This is not based on 
scientific data but pure intuition.  
Solar PV will emerge as a real option in the long term. The technology has a clear traje c-
tory, but it will take time. 
Biomass and wind energy will not be used to a great extent as these technologies take up 
too much space. It will be impossible to provide the Netherlands energy needs solely 
through wind energy, as there is not enough space.  
Wind energy and reforestation might be used to a limited extent. 
Hydrogen technology is an option but it is difficult to quantify the chances for success of 
this technology. The operation of the technology is difficult. Can be seen as the least 
likely option.  
Underground storage is more likely for the next decades.  
A new energy technology might emerge in the next 50 years, but a transition to this new 
technology is likely to take 100-200 years. Engineers are far too optimistic about the 
speed of technology transition. 
The transport sector will change for 2 reasons , climate change and congestion. No 
changes will be seen yet. There is no progress in the field. Energy efficiency has been 
improved, but translated onto new surfaces of car technology (safety, comfort, speed) 
and not into lower levels of gasoline use. Fue l-efficient cars have been around for a long 
time, but vested interests prohibit the diffusion of these vehicles. It is very difficult to 
deal with car producers and they also have a very extensive lobby group. Also, the pre-
sent day consumers like to have the fast, heavy and comfortable cars. Politicians are 
afraid to deal with this, partly because of the short-term nature of politics. 
There are substantial added benefits of introducing climate related policy measures. Re-
forestation will improve biodiversity, transport measures and air quality management 
will improve local air quality, and new forms of transport will lead to fewer accidents 
and less congestion. The overall quality of life will be improved. Extensive use of bio-
mass might have negative effects on biodiversity, as the solution goes for monoculture. 
These added benefits would have clear overlaps with agreements on acidification, the 
health directives of the EU, and biodiversity protocols.  
The implementation of climate related policy measures would have no real impact on 
economic growth. In the long term it is impossible to use this argument. All models 
looking at the long-term aspects of this come up with negligible results. We have losers 
and we have winners. Those who have to change their ways are the losers, those who 
provide the new technologies or solutions are the winners. Hundreds of models on the ef-
fects of climate measures on economic growth all come up with the same answer: -0% or 
+0% impact. If you have more losers than winners you will have a negative impact on 
the economy, but this will only be sectoral. Companies in the affected sectors will either 
have to come up with technological solutions or diversify to other activities.  
There are a number of potential winners, which will all create new employment and new 
technologies. Any predictions of negative impacts on the economy are based on sectoral 
analyses, economic non-credible threats, or their own vented interests.  
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Zylicz, Prof dr.hab Thomas  
Warsaw University, Department of Economics 
The American position makes it difficult to go ahead despite the compromise reached in 
Bonn. The EU and other countries (ex. Poland) will adopt some measures, but they will 
not be very aggressive. The Protocol will not come into force in the foreseeable future. 
Equally, ET will not come into force, although there might be some ET aspects under JI 
projects. Given the right incentives, Poland could generate 20-30 million tonnes for trad-
ing, but these incentives are not present. Domestically they can justify negative costs, 
zero costs, and costs up to USD 5 per tonne reduced. 
JI is a matter of inertia and political activity; so much has already been done that some 
projects will undoubtedly go ahead. These will most likely be bilateral projects and there 
will be no incentive for wider projects. 
Some countries will ratify the Protocol but too few for it to come into force. Russia and 
Ukraine surpluses may be activated if Russia is stimulated. If there is no ratification it is 
unlikely that Russia will go ahead on CC measures unless an attractive proposal by the 
EU is presented. Russia will not be (and was not) attracted by an US proposal (which 
did/will include formal ET and a formal framework). A EU proposal is expected to be 
less formal and combine both JI and ET. 
The suggested criteria for determination of future scenarios are sufficient and no sugges-
tions for further criteria are presented. 
Scenario 4 (low levels of CC and low levels of international co-operation) is the most 
likely. There will be no formal ET, maybe some form of surrogate ET through soft and 
discretionary JI and CDM, but it will not be considered effective. There will be no full-
fledged market for emissions. 
Political development will result in JI and CDM based on trade (and tax-) incentives 
from national governments, which will stimulate domestic companies to take action 
abroad. These projects will be of limited scale and their cost effectiveness will be com-
promised. EU countries will continue JI and tax allowance for those who obtain emission 
reductions elsewhere (ex. Netherlands, Germany).  
In the case of Poland there is a large over-supply of installed power and there will be no 
new power plants built in the next 5-10 years. The only new plants will be renewable 
plants, which will be insta lled mainly for decoration purposes, and to meet the govern-
ment’s commitment to increase the share of renewable energy from less than 1% to 7-
8% within 10 years. This commitment will be fulfilled through wind energy, hydroele c-
tricity, biomass plants, etc. There will be some decrease in CO2 as a result but these re-
ductions will not be driven by cost effectiveness (politically driven). There will be no 
new nuclear plants built in Poland or the rest of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
As soon as the EU market is liberalised there will be more energy available in Poland 
(and in CEE). This raises the problem of Poland’s large trade deficit, which will affect 
the currency rate and overturn the tendency to buy energy from the EU. The EU surplus 
of energy will therefore not be so interesting. 
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With the EU energy market liberalised and the accession towards the east there will be a 
real incentive for energy producers to change their peak hours, something that will give 
some CO2 reductions. 
EU nuclear energy will be used as much as possible and sold to the CEE, depending on 
the exchange rate but no new nuclear plants will be built. 
No new groundbreaking technologies are expected up to 2020. There will be a growing 
supply of renewables. Does not wish to speculate any further. 
There will of course be both double and triple benefits from CC related measures. There-
fore, Poland and other countries might go after CO2 reduction programmes because of 
their local advantages. At the moment deforestation is no problem in Poland and refores-
tation can (and will) be achieved through domestic policy. If credits were to be given for 
reforestation then Poland (and other countries) would have added incentives to go ahead 
with these projects. These projects are currently not driven by Kyoto but by other driving 
forces (local advantages, domestic political activity, etc.). 
There will be no aggressive CC related policies, but traditional environmental policies 
with added benefits. Most importantly will be the use of energy efficiency measures such 
as thermo-modernisation of buildings, and replacement of existing low stack burners 
with gas-fired bur ners with higher stacks. 
Using Poland as example: If there was an incentive to reduce CO2 at a selling price of 
15-20 USD per tonne, then financial profits would be the driving force for carbon reduc-
ing projects. There would also probably be a more substantial shift from coal to gas (low 
stack emissions). A total switch from coal to gas has the potential to reduce 10 mill ton-
nes of 110 mill tonnes tota l emitted, most of this in ‘good’ burners. However, there is no 
domestic incentive to undertake a total switch, and this will require international gov-
ernment to provide incentives. 
There is a barrier between energy efficiency and economic growth rate but will not put 
any number on how much energy efficiency is justifiable. CC policies must not be too 
aggressive.  
If there were potential for ET then Poland would take some commitments. If not, then as 
little as possible would be done as slowly as possible. Poland (together with some other 
countries) is unique in that it relies completely on coal. Other CEE countries, such as 
Hungary, Ukraine and Slovakia, will have an easier time to comply with commitments 
made. The Polish situation applies to other CEE countries at a lesser extent.  
Kyoto is defective as it leaves DCs behind. CDM is not good as there are no commit-
ments. DCs could take commitments without paying. These commitments would then be 
paid by third parties. This can be defined as CDM with clear targets and non-negotiable 
baselines.  
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4. Synthesis 
This chapter present a topic wise summary of the 10 interviews presented in Chapter 3. It 
also includes a synthesis, presenting the most diverting views that came forward from 
the selected number of interviews. Additionally, the main conclusions from post-Kyoto 
workshops held before September 2001 were addressed and a selection of literature on 
the research topic was reviewed to fill remaining gaps. , Areas of agreement amongst the 
interviewees are identified, expressing the robustness of energy solutions and policy 
measures. The robustness of solutions and measures is further determined by their com-
patibility with different policy scenarios. Also, the likelihood of these solutions and 
measures is explored, with a special focus on whether or not they will be dependent on 
international measures.  
Section 4.1 addresses the implementation process of the current Kyoto Protocol while 
Section 4.2 addresses the implementation of future post-Kyoto policies. In Section 4.3 
predictions of levels of climate change and the role of international co-operation is ex-
plored. The possible technology solutions expected to be implemented under the four fu-
ture climate change scenarios are synthesised in Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 pre-
sents a final synthesis of the policies and instruments that could aid the implementation 
of these technology solutions. 
4.1 Current Kyoto Protocol implementation 
4.1.1 Introduction 
The development of the implementation process of the current Kyoto Protocol (KP) is 
seen as a crucial factor on how Post-Kyoto policy implementation will be approached. 
In general, the interviewees expressed various degrees of optimism towards the future of 
the KP. The prevalent view amongst some of the interviewed experts is that progress will 
be made at the coming negotiations, but that the speed at which agreements will be made 
will depend on the positioning of the US in these future negotiations. Repeated argu-
ments state that climate measures will have little economic and environmental value 
without inclusion of the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter in any international 
agreements. There is added scepticism regarding US involvement in the climate regime, 
given their industry’s perceived strong position on competitiveness, and the recent pos i-
tioning of the White House on this matter. However, recent developments in the US 
congress, by both Republicans and Democrats, give cause for some optimism, and it is 
not seen as an impossible task to bring the US back to the centre of the negotiations.  
A number of the experts expect the ratification of the KP by several key parties to take 
place shortly, but that entry into force from 2002 cannot be expected. These experts be-
lieve that ratification of the KP will take place immediately and that entry into force can 
be expected in 2002/2003 without US participation.  
One of the main reasons for the expected progress of the implementation of the KP ex-
pressed is the political momentum as a result from the previous COPs. The Bonn agree-
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ment is thought to provide enough substance for the implementation process to continue, 
with entry into force, and steps towards a post-Kyoto framework to be taken. It is argued 
that this political momentum is reflected both in domestic programs within several 
(mainly European) countries and in the development of initiatives within supra- and mul-
tinational financing institutions. 
The positioning of the US is seen as a key factor for determining the future of post-
Kyoto policies, and especially so for determining the course of action taken by develo p-
ing nations. No or little involvement is expected from this group of nations without at 
least some level of US participation. The future of US polices is seen as very uncertain, 
although Minett believes that ‘the Americans will come on board eventually’. In the 
opinion of Pachauri US participation will require a shift in the position of civil society, 
and then especially within the US and Canada. In the view of Baumert it is essential that 
the US stay out of the KP for the first commitment period, to ensure successful ratific a-
tion of the protocol. The future prospects of the US climate policies are explored further 
by Agrawala and Andresen (2001) where the most significant development of US cli-
mate policies is stated to be ‘the close relationship that Bush himself, his cabinet and 
close advisers have with fossil interests’. It should be noted that both the article by 
Agrawala and Andresen and the majority of the interviews were held prior to September 
11 and do not reflect the impact of the latest events on international co-operation.  
The EU has played a vital role in the previous COPs and it is expected that the EU will 
strive to uphold this leadership role in the future. Verbruggen, pointing specifically to the 
EU burden sharing being perceived as a pre-ET system, raised concerns about the role of 
the EU, and their positioning in the CC negotiations. The current and future role of the 
EU in the CC negotiations has been investigated further by Gupta and Grubb eds (2000).  
Views differ on the positioning of Japan in the future negotiations, with some intervie w-
ees citing US/Japan ratification as a precondition for EU ratification. Nevertheless, Ki-
mura states that the compliance issues will most likely be resolved at COP7 and that 
Japanese ratification can be expected shortly. He also believes that Russia will take the 
lead in the ratification process, depending on how favourable they view the results from 
the coming negotiations. He acknowledges that there is still some internal confusion 
within the Russian government as to how climate change issues should be approached. A 
further investigation into Russian climate policies was undertaken by Moe and Tangen 
(2001), where it was concluded, amongst other, that the current institutional and political 
barriers for investment in Russia may prevent the full potential benefits for the country 
to be reached under the existing KP.  
4.1.2 Synthesis 
The interviewed experts’ views on the implementation of the current KP vary greatly. 
On the one extreme, ratification of the KP is not expected in the near future, leaving all 
climate-related measures to be undertaken on a voluntary and intentional basis. Never-
theless, these intentional agreements are not expected to lack substance and it is pre-
dicted that bilateral projects and domestic policy measures will play an important role in 
the lowering of greenhouse gas emissions. 
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On the other extreme, most of the experts interviewed expect ratification and entry into 
force of the KP within a few years, the end of 2002 often cited as a probable time for the 
final signing of the protocol. Although views vary over what country, or groups of coun-
tries, that will take the lead in the ratification process, most experts state that the political 
momentum from the previous COPs, and domestic targets for greenhouse gas emission 
reductions, are the most important driving factors for the implementation process of the 
KP. 
4.1.3 Robustness, likelihood and dependency on international measures 
Ratification and entry into force of the current KP is seen as both a robust and likely op-
tion. It is seen as likely that the key parties ratify the protocol before the end of 2002 and 
that the next step follows. The implementation of the protocol is also seen as robust. The 
nature of the KP makes it highly dependent, if not solely dependent, on international co-
operation and international measures. 
Domestic policy measures and bilateral projects are seen as likely policy options for the 
implementation of the current KP. Initiatives from supra- and multinational financing in-
stitutions are acknowledged, and are seen as likely measures for aiding the implementa-
tion of the KP. 
4.2 Post Kyoto Protocol implementation 
4.2.1 Introduction 
It has been hard to identify a prevailing view on how the implementation of the post-
Kyoto policies will materialise if there is a non-entry into force of the KP. In the case of 
non-entry it is expected that post-Kyoto policies will include more domestic programs 
following up on efforts already made in several European countries, bila teral projects 
driven by political will and domestic economic incentives such as tax and trade agree-
ments. The interviewees expect these initiatives will result from the ratification of the 
KP by key parties, but, as the conservative experts do not expect the KP to enter into 
force in the foreseeable future, the KP is expected to merely take the form of an inte n-
tional agreement. Still, they think these intentions will be upheld and the framework as 
developed in the KP will be used for domestic and bilateral programs on greenhouse gas 
emission reduction. 
Pachauri, who expects entry into force of the KP from 2002, admits that the details sur-
rounding the second commitment period will be difficult to predict. He states that the po-
sition of civil society in the US will be a key factor for determining US involvement, and 
resulting developing countries (DC) participation. Baumert also sees US re-entry into the 
climate negotiations as essential for the second commitment period. Hare expects the ne-
gotiations on the second commitment period, US re-entry and possible DC entry, plus 
some additional obligations under the KP, to take place sometime after 2004. Minett also 
shares this view but is sceptical about the US approach to the situation, which he de-
scribes as ‘too arrogant and almost colonial in its nature’. 
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The following commitment periods are seen by everyone to include some sort of com-
mitments by DCs, although these commitments are expected to take a different nature 
than commitments for developed countries, whose commitments are also expected to 
change nature.  
The DC commitments for the second and coming commitment periods are expected to 
take a different nature than commitments for developed countries, whose commitments 
are also expected to change nature. Several options for DC commitments are suggested, 
including binding targets with non-negotiable baselines without financial commitments, 
commitments on ‘more carbon efficient development or de-linking carbon from eco-
nomic growth’, sectoral commitments, and GNP based targets. Thus, it is difficult to es-
tablish any likely scenarios for DC participation and commitments for the second and 
later commitment periods. 
A differentiation of DCs is also expected for the post Kyoto polices. Non-Annex I parties 
are likely to be split into two groups, although there is no agreement on how this differ-
entiation should be done. A differentiation is not expected to take place on solely per 
capita or GNP comparisons, but GNP per capita is mentioned as one of the parameters 
that will be used to set an important threshold for commitments to be undertaken. The 
new group of DCs is expected to include progressive and forward thinking countries who 
recognise the problems associated with climate change, but who do not want to adopt 
Annex I like commitments. Some Latin American and Southeast Asian countries are ex-
pected to join this group, but both China and India are seen to be reluctant to accept any 
commitments. 
4.2.2 Synthesis 
The views on the post KP implementation process vary accordingly with the views to-
wards implementation of the current KP. The experts who do not expect entry into force 
of the current KP do not expect any further international agreements to follow. Instead 
they expect domestic programs following up on efforts already made in several Eur o-
pean countries, bilateral projects driven by political will and domestic economic incen-
tives such as tax and trade agreements. The framework as developed in the KP will be 
used for these domestic and bilateral pr ograms on greenhouse gas emission reduction. 
On the other extreme, given ratification and entry into force of the KP new negotiations 
on the second and coming commitment periods are likely to take place shortly. Some-
time after 2004 is mentioned as a reasonable time for these negotiations to take place. 
The main issue of these negotiations are seen to include DC participation in the climate 
regime and deepening of the targets for Annex I countries. The US positioning towards 
the KP and the coming commitment periods is seen as the most important factor for the 
determination of DC participation. No DC participation is expected without US partic i-
pation. The issue of US participation is uncertain but most experts agree that the US will 
have to come aboard at some point. 
4.2.3 Robustness, likelihood and dependency on international measures 
No prevalent view or robust scenario has been established for the implementation of the 
current KP and future climate protocols. Negotiations on the second and later commit-
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ment periods are expected to take place within a few years of ratification of the current 
KP, given such ratification. Important issues for any second or later commitment periods 
will be DC participation and new targets for the developed nations. DC participation is 
seen to be dependent on US positioning and international measures, and will also likely 
result in a differentiation between DCs and their commitments. A broadening and deep-
ening of emission targets for the developed world is seen as both a robust and likely fu-
ture scenario.  
All interviewed experts see that the commitments for the developed world, be they le-
gally binding or intentional, will be changed at any negotiations for the second and later 
commitment periods. A broadening and deepening of the emission reduction targets is 
seen as both a robust and likely scenario, although dependent on the ratification and en-
try into force of the current KP. 
4.3 Predicted climate change scenarios and the role of international co-
operation 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The level of climate change and the likelihood if international co-operation is seen to be 
the most important criteria for determination of future scenarios by all interviewed ex-
perts. Further criteria, suggested by Junfeng, include the efficiency of promotion of the 
KP and its transparency, although these criteria can also be seen as prerequisites for in-
ternational co-operation. Grubb also suggests that the positioning of the US towards in-
ternational environmental agreements as an important sub-criteria to determine the level 
of international co-operation. 
The level of international co-operation is expected by all interviewed experts to depend-
ent the actual and reported levels of climate change, although there is some disagreement 
as to what level of climate change is expected. Some experts point out that the effects of 
climate change will not be seen in the short term and that we will have to await further 
research before any conclusions are drawn upon this matter. However, none of these ex-
perts expect high levels of climate change in the foreseeable future and international co-
operation is expected to result from political will and possibilities for trade and technol-
ogy transfer between certain countries. 
Pachauri expects a high level of climate change in the future, which will come about 
from the lack of actions taken now. He also points to the findings in the Third Assess-
ment Report from IPCC1. In his view international co-operation will still be low in the 
near future, as it takes society 3-4 years to absorb the findings from the assessment re-
ports, and that international co-operation will only speed up in 2015. Both Baumert and 
Grubb are uncertain about the levels of climate change in the future, although they both 
tend to expect lower levels of climate change, Baumert points to the lack of ‘an ozone 
hole for climate change’, resulting in lower perceived levels of climate change. Grubb 
                                                 
1  For detailed descriptions of the assessment reports see IPPC-I (2001), IPPC-II (2001) and 
IPPC-III (2001). 
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believes that ‘a reasonable prospect will be doubling of concentrations with a peak in 10-
20 years’. 
The other experts are somewhat divided on the issue of future levels of climate change. 
Minett states that to establish political will single events are more important than long-
term trends. He argues that consensus on the scientific understanding of the climate 
change problem triggers higher levels of international co-operation. Hare expects high 
levels of climate change, which would result in increased international co-operation. He 
also holds the view that there is enough evidence at hand to prove the current and future 
high levels of climate change, and that waiting for long-term evidence before taking ac-
tion will undermine work already being undertaken in addition to having significant im-
pacts on the environment. Hare expects that arguments from industry in such a scenario 
would be that it is too late to do anything significant about the problem and that efforts 
should be shifted towards adaptation and a gradual transition towards a 550-560 ppmv 
concentration. This attitude would of course be expected to change in the aftermath of 
any direct climate catastrophes in rich countries.  
Moorcroft suggests that levels of CC must be de-linked from strictly involving weather 
events in the view of the general public. If levels of CC are only associated with the 
weather then a few years of good weather will result in lowered interest from the public 
towards CC, even though the problems associated with CC might not have diminished. 
4.3.2 Synthesis 
There is clear disagreement towards the expected levels of climate change and interna-
tional co-operation. All experts agree that these criteria are the most important for the de-
termination of future scenarios and the only other criteria that are mentioned are US po-
sitioning and the transparency of international co-operation. 
A clear split is seen on the level of international co-operation, with half of the inter-
viewed experts expecting low co-operation and the other expecting high international co-
operation. All interviewed experts expect the level of international co-operation to be 
dependent on the actual and reported levels of climate change. However, the linkages be-
tween the two criteria are seen as somewhat unclear.  
It is seen by many experts that we will experience low levels of perceived climate 
change in the near future, pointing to the difficulties of communicating scientific results 
to the general public. The long-term characteristics of climate change and the need for 
further research, and consensus on this research, are also pointed to as reasons for ex-
pected low levels of perceived climate change. On the other extreme some experts argue 
that we are already experiencing high levels of climate change and that the future levels 
of climate change will be even higher as a result of low international co-operation now. 
This is also in agreement with Ferguson in Bruggink and Nieuwenhout (1993) who 
states that taking half measures may lead to ‘unacceptable committed warming’ and to 
both the ‘loss of effort spent and the loss of the goal: the worst of both worlds’. 
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4.3.3 Robustness, likelihood and dependency on international measures 
There is very little agreement amongst the interviewees regarding the future scenarios 
for international co-operation and no robust options or future scenarios have been identi-
fied for this. It is seen as likely that international co-operation will depend on the per-
ceived levels of CC, although the linkages between the two are somewhat unclear. 
It is also seen as likely that the levels of CC in the near future will be perceived as low. 
This does not necessarily reflect on the actual future levels of CC, but rather the need for 
continued research and communication of the research results to the general public. The 
levels of CC in the more distant future are seen to be strongly dependent on international 
measures for GHG emission reduction measures taken now. It is seen as very likely that 
insufficient measures now will result in increased levels of CC later. 
4.4 Technologies 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Some of the interviewees stated that the choice of technology options for greenhouse gas 
reduction depends on the general trend of domestic programs and bilateral projects, 
based on political will and intentional agreements. Other experts were much more vocal 
and specific in their choices and suggestions for future technologies. 
Nuclear 
A number of the interviewees see nuclear energy as a technology that will remain for at 
least until the middle of the century. Reasons cited for this include the non-carbon nature 
of the technology, and maybe more importantly, the dependence of key nations on the 
technology. Kimura states that Japan is expected to increase its share of nuclear energy 
to 90% in the future. However, there is a prevalent view that nuclear represents an in-
terim solution and that its replacement is dependent on the intensity, and success, of 
R&D on innovative technologies and energy solutions. Nuclear energy is believed to be 
an integral part of the world’s energy supply until the middle of the century. 
Pachauri sees that the use of nuclear energy might receive a boost in some parts of the 
world, US and Japan in particular, but that it will not be a favoured option in Europe. He 
does not expect nuclear energy to take up a large part in the future world energy market. 
Baumert and Grubb are also sceptical towards the future of nuclear energy, mentioning 
both the low cost-effectiveness and low public support as major obstacles for further use 
of the technology. Verbruggen suggests that nuclear might re-emerge as an energy solu-
tion in the future if R&D on the technology yield results in the coming years. 
Other experts believe that nuclear energy, as an instrument to combat climate change, is 
a dead issue, although some countries, such as Japan, will push for increased use of the 
technology. However, public opinion is opposing to further nuclear plants to be built. 
Nuclear energy will also be excluded from JI and CDM projects. There might be discus-
sions on the use of nuclear in several countries, UK, Sweden, and Germany were me n-
tioned, and although there is strong opposition to the use of nuclear energy, the existing 
installations will not be replaced in the immediate future. Minett states that the use of 
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nuclear energy will be limited both from a cost effectiveness view point, with the tech-
nology having large hidden costs disguised as subsidies, and from an understanding that 
the technology is not ‘emotionally wanted’. He also warns about the introduction of nu-
clear energy in DCs, as this will bring about a whole new array of problems to be dealt 
with. 
The share of nuclear energy in future global energy supply is studied in detail by 
Nakicenovic, Grübler and McDonald (1998) where the share of nuclear energy is esti-
mated to range between about 4% to 14% by 2050, depending on how future energy 
markets develop and how specific nuclear technologies are deployed. 
Energy efficient technologies 
The introduction of more energy efficient technologies is seen as a no-regret option. 
Prof. Zylicz especially mentions better thermal insulation of houses in Central- and East-
ern Europe (CEE), as an important tool in achieving greenhouse gas emission reductions 
in that region. The same expert also mentions bilateral (pseudo-JI) projects involving 
conversion of existing coal fired low stack burners with gas fired burners with higher 
stacks as technology options that are certain to be explored in the future. 
The experts intervie wed also forecast more efficient use of energy in the future, and then 
especially within the transport sector. Pachauri also states that there is an abundance of 
no regret options if only they are assigned their true, and most often local, benefits. 
Baumert states that energy efficiency measures and restructuring of the power sector are 
measures that can be undertaken regardless of climate change agreements as these op-
tions have several incentives. 
Minett states that it would be possible to improve energy efficiency by 20-40%, that co-
generation can account for up to 20-30% of all energy usage, and that renewables can 
account for 20%. He believes that these options can cut 20% of 65% (or 13% in total) of 
the total emissions, without cost effectiveness being compromised. He notes that the 
timetable for implementation of these measures is more important than their respective 
costs. In his opinion the level of taxation or other economic instruments will trigger im-
plementation of climate change related measures, even when they are set at a relatively 
low level. He especially mentions the implementation of Combined Heat and Power 
(CHP), or cogeneration, as examples of this. 
Renewable energy 
There is agreement amongst the interviewees on an expected increase in the share of re-
newable energy (wind, biomass, solar and hydropower mentioned) in the coming years. 
This is expected for many reasons: domestic targets on renewable energy already agreed 
upon in several countries; the potential role of renewable energy together with energy ef-
ficiency technologies in technology transfer; and the added benefits of renewable energy 
solutions aiding other environmental and non-environmental programs, with poverty al-
leviation in rural developing areas cited as one important additional benefit.  
One energy solution mentioned by a number of the interviewed experts is biomass en-
ergy. The experts recognise the current technical limitations of biomass fuel technology, 
but expect that these will be overcome through research and development. Biomass en-
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ergy is seen as an underused option that will be given more focus in the future. Photo-
voltaic (PV) technologies are also seen to play an increasingly important role, especially 
given the latest developments on organic PV cells, by the progressive experts. Large-
scale wind energy installations are also expected to play an increasingly important role, 
including both on- and offshore installations.  
Pachauri is doubtful towards the role that renewable energy sources will have in the fu-
ture. He anticipates an increase in the use of technologies such as fuel cells, PVs, and 
more efficient biomass systems, but expects that they will take up a niche market. This 
view is countered by several other experts who expect increased use of renewables, and 
then especially biomass. Baumert stresses the need for increased subsidies for renewable 
energy systems if these energy solutions are to play a more important role in the future. 
The progressive experts identify a number of renewable energy solutions suitable for a 
future with high levels of climate change. Minett points to the two paths for greenhouse 
gas reductions identified in the Cool Europe project: a biomass dominated energy sup-
ply, and a wind and solar-based energy supply. He also points to the need for an energy 
carrier in the latter of these paths. Hydrogen is suggested as an option, but there are sev-
eral constraints on this technology including societal, technical, and significant financial 
transformation costs. The COOL project gives several pathways for reaching given car-
bon concentrations for the Netherlands (Hisschemöller ed 2001), Europe (Andersson, 
Tuinstra and Mol eds 2001) and for the global community (Berk, van Minnen, Metz and 
Moomaw 2001).  
Common for all the renewable energy solutions mentione d by the interviewees is that it 
is difficult to predict the final scale of the technologies, and the share they will all be as-
signed in the future energy system is dependent on their respective actual and perceived 
success and promotion. 
Biological sinks 
The inclusion of sinks in the KP is seen by many experts as being a weakness of the pro-
tocol. The carbon uptake levels of forestry and vegetation are disputed and the effective-
ness of the mechanism is questioned. All experts, however, expect that biological sinks 
will be used in the future, although there is disagreement as to what levels of usage that 
can be expected. According to Moorcroft there is a need to learn-by-doing in connection 
with biological sinks. He also states that there are clear natural constraints on the use of 
these sinks that must be taken into account. 
The use of biological sinks is seen by many of the interviewed experts to be beneficial if 
it is integrated with forest conservation, reforestation and biodiversity measures.  
Geological sinks 
Carbon extraction and storage technologies are subject to substantial research, especially 
in the US, and their use is seen by a few experts to hold some potential for future impor-
tance. Other experts do not share this view, with Minett labelling carbon stripping and 
disposal as ‘just a technical quick fix’. On a somehow similar note Hare sees carbon 
storage as being increasingly controversial and expects further development of this tech-
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nology to meet with strong opposition from Greenpeace and other NGOs. Geological 
disposal in oceans and in soil is seen as ‘more OK’. 
Moorcroft states that the use of geological sinks will have to be undertaken in connection 
with already established infrastructures in the oil and gas sector, with reinjection in old, 
or otherwise suitable, reservoirs. 
Innovation 
The interviewed experts, with the exception of Pachauri and Grubb, expect massive in-
novations on energy solutions within the next 50 years, but find it hard to predict which 
way the energy systems will develop. R&D is identified as a second no-regret option, 
with focus on development of innovative technologies that will allow for de-
carbonisation of the energy system. A number of the interviewees believe in innovative 
technologies emerging, but believe that many of them are already present. Fuel cell tech-
nologies already being introduced at household levels in Germany are cited as a good 
first step in the introduction of this technology.  
A hydrogen society is also seen by many as a most definite option, although it is admit-
ted that there are several routes possible for reaching the potential of hydrogen, the most 
important question is seen to be what route will be chosen. According to Hare the big 
discussion in the future will be the choice of the new energy carrier, and then especially 
what type of energy will be utilised for transport purposes, and what type of transport 
that should be developed in the future. On the other hand, Minett finds it difficult to see a 
zero fossil economy emerging within the next 50-100 years. 
4.4.2 Synthesis 
The extreme views hold, on the one hand, that nuclear energy will play an important role 
in the future, with building of new nuclear power plants and credits for these under JI 
and CDM projects, and that renewable energy sources will only take up a niche market. 
On the other extreme, a biomass or wind and solar-based energy supply system is ex-
pected to emerge as the solution for future energy supply. 
Nuclear 
The interviewees are clearly split over some of the issues concerning nuclear energy. 
Some experts expect that the share of nuclear energy will rise in the future, due to indi-
vidual nations’ strong dependency on the technology for the security of their energy sup-
plies. These same experts suggest R&D on nuclear energy, and possible future innova-
tions within the nuclear technology sector, to provide the boost for its future use. 
The other view holds that nuclear energy is not a cost-effective energy solution at all, 
with large costs hidden as subsidies. More importantly, the public trust in the technology 
is seen as being too low to justify any future nuclear energy installations. Nuclear energy 
is also not seen as a suitable option for DCs, with both the costs and the infrastructure 
requirements of the technology deemed as unsuitable for this group of countries. 
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Energy efficient technologies 
The interviewees all agreed that energy efficiency would be pursued further in the future, 
and there was very little disagreement on the level of use of these technologies. In that 
respect it has been hard to establish a spread of the views on energy efficiency and more 
energy efficient technologies.  
Energy efficiency measures are expected to be used as they have a clear added benefit in 
the lowering of resource use and an improvement in the cost-effectiveness of technolo-
gies and processes. Also, the inclusion of energy efficiency measures in technology 
transfer is seen to hold great potential for increased use of these measures. 
A restructuring of the power generation sector, with a decentralised power supply sys-
tem, is often mentioned in combination with energy efficiency measures. Combined Heat 
and Power (CHP), or cogeneration, is an often-cited option for more energy efficient 
power supply. All interviewees also expect more energy efficient measures within the 
transport sector, although again to various degrees. 
Renewable energy 
All interviewed experts agree that there will be an increase in the use of renewable en-
ergy sources in the future. The spread in the views of the interviewees is over the extent 
of usage and importance in the future energy supply these technologies will be given. 
The one extreme view holds that renewable energy systems will only constitute a niche 
market, with continued focus on further developing the energy supply systems that are 
present today. At the other end, an energy system dominated by renewable energy solu-
tions; a biomass dominated supply (35% of total supply) or a wind and solar energy 
based supply. 
Biomass energy is a technology option that is mentioned by all experts. The technical 
limitations of biomass fuel technology are recognised, but these are expected by many of 
the interviewees to be overcome through research and development. Large-scale wind 
energy installations, both onshore and offshore, and PV technologies are also expected to 
play an increasingly important role, especially given the latest developments of the tech-
nologies.  
A hydrogen society is also often cited as a potential energy solution for the future. There 
is some scepticism towards the technology in light of its current technical limitations, but 
the use of small-scale fuel cells, especially within the transport sector, is seen to hold po-
tential for future use. 
Biological sinks 
Some interviewed experts think biological sinks are to play an important role in the fu-
ture, although they are expected to generate limited credits. These interviewees also 
think the importance might increase as a result of the linkages between climate change, 
forestry, biodiversity and other environmental pressures. On the other hand, some ex-
perts also see the science behind the issue of biological sinks as controversial and object 
to its inclusion in the KP. 
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Geological sinks  
The interviewees expect geological sinks to be used in connection with existing oil and 
gas infrastructure, through re-injection into empty gas reservoirs or through injection 
into some other suitable reservoir. The technologies are seen as increasingly controver-
sial and any future development and deployment of these technologies is expected to 
meet with strong opposition from environmental pressure groups. 
Innovation 
Most experts expect significant innovation on energy systems in the future, but have a 
difficult time predicting what this might entail. It is agreed that future innovation will fo-
cus on identifying a new energy carrier, and new forms of energy that can be utilised for 
transport purposes. However, a zero fossil economy is not seen as likely to emerge 
within the next 50-100 years. 
4.4.3 Robustness, likelihood and dependency on international measures 
The interviewed experts’ technology forecasts identify a number of robust and likely 
technology solutions, many of which will not be dependent on international measures. 
Nuclear 
It is seen as likely that nuclear energy will remain as a technology for the immediate fu-
ture, or at least until the middle of the century, as several nations are strongly dependent 
on the technology for their energy supply. However, it is also seen as both robust and 
likely that nuclear is seen as an interim solution and that no, or very few, new nuclear 
plants can be expected in the future. The two main reasons cited for this are the low cost 
effectiveness of the technology, with high costs hidden as subsidies, and, maybe most 
importantly, the low public support for the technology. In addition to these reasons the 
agreement reached in Bonn is seen to exclude any future inclusion of nuclear energy in 
JI and CDM projects, thereby making the building of future nuclear power plants a 
highly unlikely future scenario.  
Energy efficient technologies 
More energy efficient technologies are seen as very robust and highly likely options that 
will take place without the added incentives of international measures. The reason for 
this is that energy efficiency measures can be undertaken for non-climate related meas-
ures, such as an increase in the cost-effectiveness of the technology. Energy efficiency 
within the transport sector is also seen as a technological development that will take 
place regardless of international environmental agreements.  
Research and development of more energy efficient technologies is seen by all experts to 
constitute a no-regret option, and thus highly likely. In addition to stimulating domestic 
research communities the role of energy efficient technologies in technology transfer is 
seen as an important reason for the undertaking of this option. 
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Renewable energy 
The use of renewable energy is expected to grow by all experts interviewed and can thus 
be classified as a very robust policy option. This increase is expected for a number of 
reasons: domestic targets on renewable energy already agreed upon in several countries; 
the potential role of renewable energy together with energy efficiency technologies in 
technology transfer; and the added benefits of renewable energy solutions aiding other 
environmental and non-environmental programs. The use of renewable energy can thus 
be seen as likely to take place regardless of international measures but will be given an 
additional boost through such measures.  
Biomass energy is seen as an underused energy option and it is seen as likely that it will 
be given more focus in the future. Large-scale wind energy plants and PV technology so-
lutions are also to be seen as highly likely energy supply options in any future energy 
scenario. It is mentioned by several of the interviewees that these energy solutions must 
be given financial incentives in order to continue R&D and implementation of the tech-
nologies. This is in accordance with Grubb et.al (1992) who states that the growth of 
wind energy technology is strongly dependent on the scale, nature and consistency of 
government politics.  
Several experts mention a hydrogen society as a likely future scenario, at the same time 
acknowledging the current technical and infrastructure limitations of the technology. 
Thus, the likelihood of the technology is seen to be strongly dependent on the research 
and development that goes into it. For the moment, the development of hydrogen tech-
nology is seen to be independent of international measures, but a price for carbon and an 
effective ET system are seen to give additional boost to its future use. 
Biological sinks 
The use of biological sinks is seen as a robust option, although there is disagreement to 
what level of usage the mechanism will have. This is seen to be strongly dependent on 
international measures, and well-defined guidelines and regulations for the credits to be 
achieved by such measures. 
It is seen as likely that biological sinks will experience higher levels of use if the mecha-
nism is linked with forest conversation, reforestation and biodiversity measures. 
Geological sinks  
There is very little agreement amongst the interviewed experts regarding the use of geo-
logical sinks and no robust or likely options were identified. There was no mention of 
any inclusion of these measures in international agreements and the issue was not given 
particular attention by any of the interviewees. 
Innovation 
It is seen as both robust and likely that there will be technology innovations within the 
energy sector within the next 50 years. These innovations will result from R&D on en-
ergy and non-energy technology solutions, and will be the result of international co-
operation to the extent that R&D is co-ordinated on an international level. 
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The most mentioned area of innovation was the transport sector, and it can be seen as 
likely that the attention of R&D will focus on finding a new energy carrier for this sec-
tor. No robust or likely technology options for the transport sector has been identified, 
although a hydrogen society, which would involve hydrogen fuel cells for vehicles, was 
mentioned in connection with other questions. 
4.5 Policy implementation 
4.5.1 Introduction 
A prevailing position amongst the interviewees is that energy efficiency measures and 
research and development on innovative technologies are to be seen as the no-regret 
policies that will be undertaken regardless of any future scenario. Technology transfer, 
especially of energy efficiency technologies, is seen as increasingly important for deve l-
oping nations in their combat to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Here, technology 
transfer is given a broad definition, including a broad set of processes covering the flows 
of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to CC (Metz et.al 
2000). All three Kyoto Mechanisms (KMs) are seen as important instruments, which will 
certainly be used to various degrees, depending on the level of international co-
operation. Prof. Zylicz again points out that most international projects will be bilateral 
in the beginning, driven more by the political momentum and political will in European 
countries than any economical or environmental considerations. 
The understanding that energy efficiency measures, R&D, and technology transfer are to 
be considered as no-regret options is not shared by Hare. He states that he does not be-
lieve in the concept of no-regret options. Although he admits that energy efficiency and 
R&D can be seen as such, he points to the lack of action on these policies in the past. If 
these options really were seen as no-regret options they would have been implemented to 
a much higher degree already. In his view no-regret policies have been identified but 
politicians too often cut back on funding, and the implementation of these options is of-
ten met with opposition when initiated. 
Prof. Zylicz identifies pseudo-JI projects driven by political will, taxes and trade incen-
tives as emerging instruments within Europe. These projects are expected to include both 
energy efficiency measures and process related measures, such as conversion of existing 
coal fired low stack burners with gas fired burners with higher stacks. These projects will 
not be economically driven, in fact they are not expected to be cost effective, but if in-
ternational co-operation can result in increased benefits, in reality: a higher price for car-
bon, then these projects are expected to flourish and their impacts to significantly in-
crease. 
Pachauri does not believe that the KMs will play a major role in the near future and he is 
sceptical to the scale at which these mechanisms will be implemented. He does not ex-
pect larger reductions than 1-1.5% (from 1990 levels) within the first commitment pe-
riod. In his view a key issue will be to see how the money-flow from the North to the 
South will develop, especially in the light of the new funds that are being introduced. 
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is mentioned in particular. See also Gupta  
(1995 and 1997) for a further investigation of the financial mechanisms for the imple-
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mentation of the FCCC, and the North-South aspects of the GEF. Other policy instru-
ments mentioned by Pachauri include pricing and taxation of energy at a European level 
and instruments that are explored by several researchers. Sachs, Loske and Linz et al. 
(1998) not only points out the importance of introducing such instruments for control of 
the environment but also identify the need to reduce ecologically damaging subsidies 
and tax provisions. 
Baumert and Grubb are also sceptical about the role of the KMs but expect that emission 
trading will play an important role for the first and coming commitment periods. Accor d-
ing to Baumert the momentum for ET has been building for years and is seen as more in-
teresting for both business and government than taxation. These efforts will also all be 
linked to energy efficiency and energy sector reform.  
A variety of policy instruments will be used to meet the obligations under the current KP 
and post-Kyoto agreements. ET on European level and EU programs on enhancement of 
renewable energies, including energy efficiency standards and domestic programs on re-
newable energy, are all options that are expected in the near future. Energy taxation at 
EU level is also an option that will possibly emerge, and changes at the transport level 
within EU should be expected. 
Minett states that it will be important to introduce proper standards on energy use, as al-
ready seen in the energy sector. He also suggests a phasing out of power generation 
where energy standards, such as already seen on appliances and cars, could also be trans-
ferred to power stations. The standards could be put as carbon efficiency, age, or effi-
ciency. By tightening the targets over time there would be a gradual phasing out of the 
most polluting stations and processes. This will open space for renewables and cogenera-
tion. This measure should also be introduced for cars and appliances on a larger Eur o-
pean scale. The expert notes that the Commission is willing to go down this and other 
routes, but that Member States (MS) are more sceptical. He believes that increased levels 
of climate change will result in increased MS participation, and we might have a shift 
from the traditional north-south EU divide into an east-west divide. Then again, he notes, 
‘the CEE countries might surprise us  
Other policy instruments recommended by Minett include specific targets for EU me m-
ber states, either carbon or efficiency targets, which should be set through environmental 
policies as energy policies will not allow for these changes under the Treaty. He sees that 
these targets will have to be set in a way such that governments will have to meet at least 
two targets within their term of office. In this way he believes we will avoid responsibil-
ity being placed on previous administrations, the reluctance to pass legislation by gov-
ernments, and other person problems. He states that ‘governments are not good at long 
term planning’ and suggests that the way to avoid this problem is to use international 
treaties. The targets could also be set under these treaties, although not for the first com-
mitment period of the KP. Targets should be annual or biannual, ensuring that two mile-
stones are met per parliament/term of office.  
As for immediate action in countries outside the EU, Hare expects that New Zealand will 
deal with their need to improve the energy efficiency of their economy and that no fur-
ther fossil options will be explored there. He expects no significant action from either 
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Australia or Canada, whereas Japan is expected to actively use the KMs and introduce 
top-down rules for energy efficiency.  
Climate change related policies and instruments are seen by all experts to have both 
double and triple benefits. Junfeng especially mentions poverty alleviation in rural areas 
resulting from wind and solar energy projects. Pachauri sees that the link between cli-
mate change related measures, added benefits, and other international agreements is still 
unclear. He believes that more co-ordination is important to properly link these agree-
ments. A focused and efficient use of resources for implementation is seen as necessary. 
He also identifies areas of overlap, including the Montreal Protocol, Certification, Biodi-
versity, and Forestry, and stresses the need for a system to co-ordinate these overlaps. 
The issue of synergy between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols and efforts to enhancing 
synergy between environmental agreements, including the Environmental Management 
Group recommended by the UN and scheduled to start in 2001, is described in detail by 
Oberthür (2001). 
Baumert agrees that there are definite double benefits and linkages, such as in land use 
change and forestry. He states that these benefits will assist not only in tropical areas but 
also in areas of desertification. In his view there is certainly potential for climate protec-
tion offsets to be used for biological diversity measures leveraged to make ecosystems 
healthier. ‘There is a need for environmental criteria in the KP that go beyond simply 
climate change related measures’. 
On another note, Hare believes that without any economic incentives resulting from in-
ternational co-operation present, the benefits are not seen as significant to justify pro-
jects. However, given the right economic incentives, projects that will address green-
house gas reductions, water management, biodiversity and deforestation, are all expected 
to play an increasingly important role, not only in climate change policies, but all envi-
ronmental problem areas.  
All interviewed experts agree that there will be continuation of some already agreed do-
mestic and international programs and technology solutions regardless of international 
co-operation. This progress will come about for different reasons, political drive once 
again cited as an important factor. In the view of Hare, however, most countries will not 
go ahead with their programs in the absence of international action. In his understanding 
the UK, Sweden, Germany and maybe also the Netherlands are countries that are seen as 
progressive enough to continue their work regardless of international agreements. No ac-
tions are seen as guaranteed at EU level. In the absence of an international agreement 
Hare believes that the leaders, Germany mentioned, will probably lose their interest in 
climate change policy development and their leadership position might collapse. 
No dominant position on the issue of policy options versus economic growth has been 
established. Some of the interviewees claim that there exists a point of optimal abate-
ment, but none are able to tell exactly where this point will be and how it should be iden-
tified. Again, this reflects on the issue of economic incentives being provided through in-
ternational agreements, as the conservatives do not see most policy options as cost effec-
tive at this moment, of course with the exception of the no-regret policies as identified 
by these experts. 
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Pachauri believes that the implementation of climate change related measures will have 
no significant impact on economic growth, stating that local, and global, benefits need to 
be adequately quantified. This view is shared by Baumert who states that climate change 
related policy measures need to be perceived as good for the economy and that low cost 
measures must be pursued. Grubb does not believe that climate change measures will 
have any negative impact on economical growth whatsoever. In his opinion the cost of 
these measures will amount to 0.1-0.2% of GNP, maybe higher for some countries. This 
will be outweighed by more strategic innovation and less use of resources. Verbruggen 
points out that there will be winners and losers but that overall impact on the economy 
will be zero as the two will outweigh each other. Moorcroft points to the inadequacy of 
our current economic models to deal with these questions, suggesting that analysis with 
beneficial growth models will show positive impacts on the economy.  
This view is shared by Minett who states that a move towards more sustainable tech-
nologies will stimulate technological development and create a whole new market that 
will contribute to the economy. He states that cogeneration, renewables, and energy effi-
ciency are all beneficial for the economy, whereas end-of-pipe solutions are merely 
costs. On the other hand, Minett believes that there might be an effect on the economy as 
the reduction commitments are increased, but that new economies might emerge that will 
offset any negative impacts. Hare points out that it will be easier to renew infrastructure 
with a high level of economic growth as there will be larger replacement of capital, and 
the system might be self-regenerating. For developing countries there might be a differ-
ent dynamic. He expects that failure of energy and non-energy technology solutions to 
repay their investments in these countries will result in a lock-in on fossil technologies. 
4.5.2 Synthesis 
All experts agree that the Kyoto Mechanisms (KMs) will be used, but there is disagree-
ment as to what level of use they will have and what importance they will play. On the 
one extreme no significant impact is expected from these mechanisms, whereas on the 
other extreme they are expected to play a significant role in meeting the commitments 
under the current and future climate protocols.  
Other policy instruments mentioned by the interviewees include pricing and taxation of 
energy at a European level, and to a larger extent, energy efficiency standards or targets, 
and domestic programs on renewable energy. Changes at the transport level within EU 
should also be expected.  
CC and CC related policies and instruments are seen by all experts to have both double 
and triple benefits. The benefits identified vary somewhat, but several experts mention 
the links between CC measures and forestry conservation, land use and land use change. 
Additional linkages mentioned include control of ozone depleting substances, issues 
concerning desertification, biodiversity, and poverty alleviation in rural areas in DCs. A 
further non-environmental benefit is identified as technological leadership, and thereby 
the emergence of new technologies and new economies.  
Additionally, CC and CC related measures are seen to have complex impacts on trade 
and trade regimes. Most importantly, the understanding of the links between ET and the 
other two KMs on international trade are seen as insufficient and suggested as areas for 
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further research. The importance of a careful design of an ET system to avoid conflicts 
with international trade and international trade law is covered further by Grimeaud 
(2001). Hasselknippe, Høibye and Pautler (2002) give an overview of a number of na-
tional GHG ET schemes and their links to the other KMs. 
On the issue of the impact of climate and climate related measures on the economic 
growth there is again a clear divide. Some of the experts state that this is a very impor-
tant consideration that should always be taken into account when designing climate poli-
cies, whereas others dismiss this notion as nonsense. On the other hand, some experts 
state that if the local and global benefits are assigned their true value there should be no 
need for further added economic incentives from international measures. On a similar 
note, according to Shogren in Carraro ed (2000) benefits must be properly quantified in 
order to find a price that will induce DCs to come aboard the KP. 
Additional benefits that should be quantified are the benefits of technological leadership, 
the emergence of new technologies, and more controlled use of resources. This is also 
reflected in Patt (1999) where it is stated that ‘although economic models are of great use 
in guiding decision-makers on some aspects of the problem, they provide an incomplete 
picture of the fundamental decision of when and how much to act to avoid climate 
change'. 
4.5.3 Robustness, likelihood and dependency on international measures 
The use of the KMs is agreed by all the interviewed experts and the can be seen as robust 
policy option. However, the likelihood of the different mechanisms is more uncertain. 
The level of usage of the KMs is seen to be clearly dependent on the level of interna-
tional co-operation. ET is seen as the most likely of the KMs as the political momentum 
for this measure is great, coupled with a clear and present interest from business and in-
dustry. The use of the other two KMs, JI and CDM is unclear, and is seen to be even 
more strongly linked to international measures. According to Brander (2001) the major 
obstacles with the KMs are: supplementarity, hot air, adaptation tax, the inclusion of 
sinks, crediting periods, compliance rules and liability provisions, and transaction and 
institutional costs.  
Energy efficiency standards and domestic programs on renewables are mentioned by 
several of the interviewed experts and can be seen as robust and likely policy options 
that are expected in the near future. Pricing and taxation are not seen as very robust cli-
mate measures and their likelihood is also not seen as high. This should especially be 
seen in the light of the relative high likelihood of ET, with taxation being seen as less in-
teresting, especially from a business perspective.  
Several added benefits from climate and climate related measures were identified and 
clearly robust and likely linkages are found between CC measures and forestry conserva-
tion, land use and land use change. The emergence of new technologies, technological 
leadership and new economies can also be seen as robust and likely scenarios to emerge 
from CC measures. 
Only a few experts identify a significant impact of CC measures on economic growth. 
The majority expects CC measures to have either a limited and justifiable negative im-
pact, or indeed a positive impact, on economic growth and this can thus be seen as likely. 
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Again, this reflects on the issue of economic incentives being provided through interna-
tional agreements, as further economic incentives provided through these agreements 
would limit the disagreement on this issue. 
4.6 Pace of greenhouse gas emission reductions 
4.6.1 Introduction 
Given the diversity of views amongst the interviewed experts on a number of issues it is 
hardly surprising that their views on the pace of GHG emission reductions cover a wide 
area of future scenarios. In addition, the time-scales of the emission reduction forecasts 
are different, with some interviewees choosing not to speculate much further than the 
first commitment period. 
Zylicz expects that by 2008-2012 the Annex I countries, including the US, will reach 
their Kyoto targets. The only exceptions are seen to be economies in transition, which 
will be somewhat below their respective targets. He does not expect non-Annex I coun-
tries to increase their emissions dramatically: perhaps 20% over the 1990 level. Moor-
croft also does not wish to speculate any further than the end of the first compliance pe-
riod. He expects that 60% of the KP target will be met by the end of the first compliance 
period, but also that ‘if we focus on the game then the results will be better’. Kimura 
does not expect any reduction of GHG emissions from 1990 levels to be achieved, ex-
cept from in the EU. He states that he does not have enough information to speculate any 
further. 
Baumert comments that any prediction will of course depend on whether the KP enters 
into force or not, and many other factors. He states that he would be very impressed if 
industrialised countries returned to 1990 levels by 2010, giving this as his best-case sce-
nario. Continuing with this scenario, reductions on the order of 20% by industrialised 
countries could be achieved by 2020. If this pace were to continue for the following 10 
years reductions on the order of 40% would be achieved by 2030. Using 1990 as a 
benchmark, he does not expect developing countries will return to those levels until 2030 
or beyond. He adds that this is ‘a wild guess’ and dependent upon a myriad of factors, 
such as technological development, technology transfer, the evolution of the multilateral 
trading system (not ET), democratisation, the future physical impacts of climate change, 
etc. 
A very rough guess by Grubb estimates around 1% GHG reduction per year post 2010 
for Annex I countries. It is not clear whether this assumes that 1990 levels are reached by 
2010 or not. Assuming that reductions only start effectively in 2010 this would result in 
Annex I countries reaching their 1990 levels around 20202, with GHG reductions on the 
order of 10% by 2030 and 30% by 2050. If we assume that the KP targets are reached for 
the first commitment period this pace of reduction would result in about 25% GHG re-
ductions by 2030 and 45% by 2050. 
                                                 
2  This estimate is based on UNEP data on emissions of GHG in Annex I countries and globally 
produced for COP6. The data can be accessed at: http://www.grida.no/climate/. 
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Verbruggen estimates that reductions in the magnitude of 10% could be reached by 
2010, but only if the KP mechanisms are working well and the instruments are credible. 
He would then expect a doubling every 10 years, resulting in reductions of 30% by 2030 
and 50% by 2050. 
The COOL project investigates the possibilities for reducing GHG emissions by 80% by 
2050. According to Minett this reduction can be reached if there is a shift of the energy 
system towards renewable based energy supplies. 
The other experts either chose not to speculate on the pace of GHG emission reductions, 
or did not respond to our request. Further forecasts on the pace of reduction will be in-
cluded in any later versions of this report. 
4.6.2 Synthesis 
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the various emission projections for Annex I 
countries suggested by the interviewed experts. The figure does not show the views of 
Zylicz, Moorcroft and Kimura who chose not to speculate any further than the end of the 
first compliance period to the KP. The curves of the emission projections have in some 
cases been extrapolated using the growth rates suggested by the interviewees. Grubb is 
represented by two curves, reflecting the different starting points of the GHG emission 
reductions, now or in 2010. It should also be noted that the emission forecasts by Bau-
mert and Minett follow the same reduction pattern for the period 2020 to 2050. 
 
Figure 1 Emission projections for Annex I countries, 1990 to 2050. In percentages. 
 
The two extremes for the future GHG emission reduction are clearly presented in Figure 
1. The range of reduction is between 10% and 40% by 2030 and 30% and 80% by 2050. 
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These emission forecasts are not easily translated into concentration levels. A full analy-
sis would require the use of atmospheric modelling and would be outside the scope of 
this report. However, Enting (1998) gives projected concentrations for various Annex I 
emission reduction scenarios. A quick comparison with these projections shows that the 
range of concentration levels goes from 430 ppmv to 440 ppmv in 2030 and 450 ppmv to 
470 ppmv in 2050. These estimates are in line with the projected concentrations calc u-
lated by Enting, where it is stated that ‘going from a 1% per annum reduction to 2% per 
annum reduction achieves little change in the level of CO2 in the atmosphere, if reduc-
tions are confined to Annex I nations’. The estimates are also in accordance with IPCC 
Technical Paper 4 (IPCC, 1997) where it is shown that a 2% reduction per year starting 
now, roughly corresponding to an 80% reduction by 2050, would result in a clear ten-
dency towards a stabilised concentration from 2100. 
A study by van Vuuren and de Vries (2001) from the National Institute of Public Health 
and the Environment (RIVM) in the Netherlands investigates two different mitigation 
scenarios for stabilising CO2 concentrations at 450 ppmv by 2100, based on the B1 base-
line scenario3. The study uses the same projections as Enting4 and shows that a stabilisa-
tion at 450 ppmv by 2100 is technically feasible. The costs and benefits of early action 
versus delayed response were also studied and it was found that ‘postponing measures 
foregoes the benefits of learning-by-doing’. 
4.6.3 Robustness, likelihood and dependency on international measures 
No generally agreed view on the pace of GHG emission reductions could be derived 
from the interviews and thus no robust or likely scenario has been identified. The emis-
sion reduction scenarios are seen to be highly dependent on international measures and 
co-operation. Without international agreement on the KP and its future compliance peri-
ods only limited GHG reductions are expected.  
                                                 
3  See the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (IPCC, 2000). 
4  Personal communication with Mr Michel den Elzen from RIVM. 
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5. Summary 
This report builds on interviews conducted with 10 international experts on climate 
change and climate change related measures and policies and a small review of results 
from international workshops and international literature on these issues. The focus of 
the research was on the question: what policy measures and instruments, including tech-
nology options, have to be taken in the short-term (e.g. 2003) to facilitate long-term (af-
ter 2010) climate policy development? The objective of the research was to present an 
overview of the different views on post-Kyoto climate policy implementation and not to 
give a blueprint of future technologies. Gaps in visions brought forward were filled to 
the extent possible based on available literature and results from workshops on post-
Kyoto issues. The results of the research were analysed to determine whether policy op-
tions are robust (i.e. that they are compatible with different socio-economic development 
scenarios) or if they are likely to be autonomous. The possible relationship with the do-
mestic measures and international co-operation were also identified. 
The majority of the interviewed experts expect ratification and entry into force of the KP 
within a few years. It is agreed that the political momentum from the previous COPs, and 
domestic targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions, are the most important driving 
factors for the implementation process of the KP. The implementation of the KP is ex-
pected regardless of the US positioning towards the process. Nevertheless, the posit ion-
ing is seen as important for the development of the climate change regime (e.g. the de-
velopment and functioning of the FCCC process and developing country participation in 
the KP).  
If there is no entry into force of the current KP then no further international agreements 
are expected to follow. Given ratification and entry into force of the current KP new ne-
gotiations on the second and/or coming commitment periods are likely to take place 
shortly (after 2004). The main issues of these negotiations are seen to include Develop-
ing Country (DC) participation in the climate regime and deepening of the targets for 
Annex I countries. The targets for DCs are expected to take on a different nature than 
current KP targets for Annex I countries, and a differentiation of the DCs is also ex-
pected. 
It is seen as likely that the levels of climate change will be perceived as low in the near 
future, resulting from the difficulties of communicating scientific results to the general 
public. This does not reflect on actual levels of climate change, which are expected to in-
crease significantly in the absence of international measures taken now. The level of in-
ternational co-operation is seen to be dependent on the actual and reported levels of cli-
mate change and on public perception.  
The technology forecasts identify a number of robust and likely technology solutions, 
many of which will not be dependent on international measures. More energy efficient 
technologies for households, industry and transport are seen as very robust options and 
highly likely to take place without the added incentives of domestic measures and/or in-
ternational so-operation. The role of especially industrial and transport energy efficient 
technologies in technology transfer is seen as an important reason for the undertaking of 
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these options. All experts agree that there will be an increase in the use of renewable en-
ergy sources in the future. Biomass energy is seen as an underused and likely option that 
will be given more focus in the future. Photovoltaic  technologies and large-scale wind 
energy installations are both seen to play an increasingly important role, especially given 
the latest developments of the technologies, and are seen as highly likely energy supply 
options in any future energy scenario. A hydrogen society is often cited as a potential 
energy solution for the future. However, the likelihood of the technology is seen to be 
strongly dependent on the research and development that will go into the technology. It 
is seen as likely that nuclear energy will remain as an interim technology solution until 
the middle of the century. It is agreed that future innovation will focus on identifying a 
new energy carrier, and new forms of energy that can be utilised for transport purposes. 
Nevertheless, a zero fossil economy is not seen as likely to emerge within the next 50-
100 years. 
The interviewees do not see carbon extraction and disposal technologies as likely to hold 
any potential of future importance. They do think biological sinks will play an important 
role in the future, although they are expected to generate limited credits. They expect 
geological sinks to be used in connection with existing oil and gas infrastructure, but 
they do not expected them to play a prominent role in future GHG abatement programs. 
The experts think the level of use of the Kyoto Mechanisms (KMs) is clearly dependent 
on the level of international co-operation. Emissions Trading (ET) is seen as the most 
likely of the KMs as the political momentum for this measure is great, coupled with a 
clear and present interest from business and industry. The use of the other two KMs, 
Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), is unclear and 
they are seen to be even more strongly linked to international measures. Other policy in-
struments mentioned include pricing and taxation of energy at a European level.  
Climate change- and climate change related policies and instruments are seen by the in-
terviewees not only to have direct positive effects on future climate and benefits for 
reduction of direct impacts, but also to have many other environmental- and non-
environmental benefits. These include forestry conservation, land use and land use 
change, biodiversity, control of ozone depleting substances, issues concerning desertif i-
cation, and poverty alleviation in rural areas in DCs. An additional benefit is technologi-
cal leadership, and thereby the emergence of new technologies and new economies.  
Climate change- and climate change related measures are seen to have very little impact 
on economic growth by the interviewees. It is argued that analysis using current eco-
nomic models will show some small negative impacts. New economic models looking at 
beneficial growth, including properly quantified costs and damages, are expected to yield 
positive impacts of climate change related measures on economic growth. 
The pace of GHG emission reduction predicted by the interviewees ranges from 10% to 
40% by 2030 and 30% to 80% by 2050. By using data from CSIRO and RIVM it is es-
timated that these reduction levels will correspond to CO2 concentration levels of 430-
440 ppmv in 2030 and 450-470 ppmv in 2050.  
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6. Samenvatting 
In dit onderzoek naar internationale visies op post-Kyoto klimaatbeleidsimplementatie 
werden 10 internationaal gerespecteerde experts op het gebied van klimaatverandering, 
klimaatbeleid en klimaatverandering gerelateerde maatregelen geïnterviewd. Daarnaast 
werden de resultaten van een aantal internationale workshops en literatuur over deze on-
derwerpen gereviewd. Speciale aandacht werd besteed aan de vraag welke maatregelen 
en instrumenten, met inbegrip van technologische opties, op korte termijn (vanaf 2003) 
noodzakelijk zijn ter facilitering van lange termijn (na 2010) beleidsontwikkeling. Het 
onderzoek had tot doel inzicht in de extreme visies op op klimaatbeleidsimplementatie te 
verkrijgen en niet om een blauwdruk voor technologische opties te geven. Op basis van 
beschikbare literatuur en resultaten van recent gehouden post-Kyoto workshops vond 
aanvulling plaats op punten waar de geïnterviewden geen duidelijke visie naar voren 
brachten. De robuustheid van geïdentificeerde opties en maatregelen werd bekeken op 
basis van de compatibiliteit met verschillende socio-economische ontwikkelingsscena-
rio’s. Tot slot werd onderzocht of het waarschijnlijk is dat de opties en maatregelen zon-
der binnenlandse beleidsmaatregelen en/of internationale samenwerking tot stand zullen 
komen. 
De meerderheid van de geïnterviewden verwachten dat het Kyoto Protocol (KP) binnen 
enkele jaren zal worden geratificeerd en van kracht zal worden. Als belangrijkste drij-
vende krachten achter de implementatie van het KP worden de uit de afgelopen Confe-
rences of Parties (COPs) voortkomende politieke momentum en de binnenlandse doe l-
stellingen voor reductie van broeikasgasemissies genoemd. Verwacht wordt dat, onge-
acht de positie van de VS, de implementatie van het KP door zal gaan. De positie van de 
VS ten aanzien van het proces wordt echter als belangrijke factor voor de ontwikkeling 
van het regiem gezien. Hierbij wordt met name de ontwikkeling en het functioneren van 
het FCCC proces en de deelname door ontwikkelingslanden in het KP bedoeld. 
De geinterviewden verwachten dat nieuwe internationale overeenkomsten niet tot stand 
zullen komen indien het huidige KP niet van kracht wordt. Indien het huidige KP in de 
komende jaren geratificeerd en van kracht wordt dan zullen de onderhandelingen voor de 
tweede en/of latere perioden van verplichtingen op korte termijn, waarschijnlijk na 2004, 
van start gaan. Als belangrijkste onderwerpen van deze onderhandelingen werden de 
deelname van ontwikkelingslanden in het regiem en een verdieping van de doelstellingen 
voor Annex I landen genoemd. Aangegeven werd dat doelstellingen voor ontwikkelings-
landen in de komende perioden waarschijnlijk anders zullen zijn dan de doe lstellingen 
voor Annex I landen in het huidige KP. Tevens wordt verwacht dat een verdere differen-
tiatie van doelstellingen tussen verschillende groepen van ontwikkelingsla nden zal 
plaatsvinden. 
Volgens een aantal geintervie wden zal in nabije toekomst zal, door slechte communica-
tie van wetenschappelijke onderzoeksresultaten, het algemene publiek waarschijnlijk 
denken dat klimaatverandering een langzaam proces is. Verwacht wordt derhalve dat, bij 
afwezigheid van internationale  maatregelen, klimaatverandering significant zal toene-
men in de nabije toekomst. De mate van internationale samenwerking wordt sterk afha n-
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kelijk geacht van de waargenomen en gerapporteerde klimaatverandering en de publieke 
perceptie. 
Een aantal robuuste en waarschijnlijke technische oplossingen voor het terugdringen van 
de emissie van broeikasgassen werden geïdentificeerd waarvan een groot deel onafha n-
kelijk van internationale samenwerking tot stand zal komen. Een toename van de inzet 
van energie -efficiënte technologieën in huishoudens, industrie en transport wordt gezien 
als zeer robuuste het is zeer waarschijnlijk dat deze opties onafhankelijk van binnenland-
se beleidsmaatregelen en/of internationale samenwerking tot stand zullen komen. Een 
belangrijke rede n hiervoor is de verwachte grote rol die energie -efficiënte technologieën, 
met name voor industrie en transport, zullen spelen in technologieoverdracht. Verder is 
er consensus over dat het gebruik van hernieuwbare energiebronnen in de nabije toe-
komst sterk zal toenemen. Biomassa wordt gezien als onderbenutte en waarschijnlijke 
optie welke in de nabije toekomst meer aandacht zal krijgen. Verder wordt verwacht dat 
fotovoltaische technologieën en grootschalige windenergie, vooral gezien de recente 
ontwikkelingen van deze technologieën, in de nabije toekomst een belangrijke rol in de 
energielevering zullen gaan spelen. Nucleaire energie wordt als een interim technologi-
sche oplossing gezien tot halverwege deze eeuw. Een waterstofmaatschappij wordt vaak 
geciteerd als potentiële energie oplossing voor de toekomst. De waarschijnlijkheid hie r-
van wordt echter sterk afhankelijk geacht van de onderzoeks - en ontwikkelingsactivite i-
ten in de nabije toekomst. Er bestaat overeenstemming over dat toekomstige innovatie 
zich vooral zal richten op het identificeren van nieuwe energiedragers en nieuwe vormen 
van energie voor transport. Desalniettemin wordt het niet waarschijnlijk geacht dat in de 
komende 50 tot 100 jaar een nul procent fossiele brandstofeconomie gerealiseerd zal 
worden. 
De geinterviewden achten het wordt niet waarschijnlijk dat koolstofextractie en –
verwijdering in de toekomst grote potentie zullen hebben voor het reduceren van emis-
sies van broeikasgassen naar de atmosfeer. Zij verwachten wel dat biologische sinks een 
belangrijke rol spelen, hoewel verwacht wordt dat deze slechts in beperkte mate credits 
zullen genereren, terwijl geologische sinks waarschijnlijk benut zullen worden in same n-
hang met bestaande olie- en gasinfrastructuur. Zij verwachten echter niet dat geologische 
sinks een prominente rol in toekomstige programma’s ter vermindering van broeikasga-
semissies zullen innemen.  
De mate van gebruik van de Kyoto Mechanismen (KMs) wordt sterk afhankelijk van de 
mate van internationale samenwerking gezien. Emissie handel (‘Emission Trading’) 
wordt gezien als het meest waarschijnlijke Kyoto mechanisme omdat het politieke mo-
mentum hiervoor het grootst is en er een duidelijke interesse vanuit het bedrijfsleven en 
de industrie voor dit mechanisme is. Het gebruik van de twee andere mechanismen, 
‘Joint Implementation’ en ‘Clean Development Mechanism’, is onduidelijk. Zij worden 
gezien als sterk gekoppeld aan internationale maatregelen. Andere beleidsinstrumenten 
die werden genoemd zijn prijsbeleid en belasting op energie op Europees niveau. 
Klimaatverandering gerelateerd beleid en beleidsinstrumenten hebben, naast voordelen 
voor het klimaat en vermindering van mogelijke directe effecten, ook vaak vele andere 
voordelen. Door de geinterviewden werden voordelen voor bescherming van bossen, 
landgebruik en veranderingen in landgebruik, biodiversiteit, bescherming van de ozon-
laag, tegengaan van verwoestijning en armoedereductie in rurale gebieden in ontwikke-
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lingslanden genoemd. Een extra voordeel is technologisch leiderschap wat gepaard gaat 
met het opkomen van nieuwe technologieën en nieuwe economieën. 
De geinterviewden verwachten dat klimaatverandering gerelateerde maatregelen weinig 
effect zal hebben op mondiale economische groei. Analyses met bestaande economische 
modellen geve n aan dat kleine negatieve effecten op de mondiale economische groei op 
zouden kunnen treden. Nieuwe economische modellen, die op een juiste wijze de kosten 
van technologieën en schade aan systemen meenemen zullen echter naar verwachting 
positieve effecten van maatregelen op economische groei aantonen. De eerdergenoemde 
indirecte voordelen van maatregelen zullen de positieve effecten mogelijk vergroten.  
Ten slotte verwachten de geinterviewden dat de emissies van broeikasgassen, in CO2 
equivale nten, tegen 2030 10 tot 40% lager zullen zijn dan het 1990 niveau. Tegen 2050 
wordt dit verwacht op te lopen tot 30 tot 80% lager dan het 1990 niveau. Op basis van 
data van CSIRO en RIVM werd geschat dat deze emissiereducties zullen leiden tot CO2 
concentraties in de atmosfeer van 430 tot 440 ppmv in 2030 en 450 tot 470 ppmv in 
2050. 
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Appendix I. Key interview questions 
The key questions that emerge from the above discussion are presented below. These 
questions are not to be seen as questions for a questionnaire and thus can be developed 
further and adapted based on and during the interviews. 
a) What is the likely future of the Kyoto Protocol? How do you expect that policy 
will/should develop in the post-Kyoto period (e.g. after 2010) internationally and 
domestically? (The purpose of this question is to allow the expert to give his own 
view on the possible future of the climate change regime, and to give us the op-
portunity to include elements we had not thought of before. Thus the linkage to 
and importance of other conventions will also be addressed here) 
b) In particular, what do you think is likely to happen? How can the implementation 
of the FCCC be continued and the momentum kept up even in the absence of the 
entry into force of the KPFCCC. 
a. All key parties ratify the Protocol and the next steps follow? 
b.  The Protocol is ratified by Europe, Russia, Ukraine, key developing 
countries and AOSIS; and although it does not enter into force, countries 
take this seriously. 
c. Only AOSIS ratifies the Protocol and no one takes it seriously. 
d.  Despite non-entry into force, most countries take it seriously: Implemen-
tation without ratification. 
c) We have selected two criteria to determine future scenarios: the changing climate 
and the likelihood of international co-operation: are these two criteria sufficient 
in your view or would you suggest other criteria?  
d) Given these criteria, what policies and instruments are likely to be undertaken in 
each of the four scenarios and why?  
e) What will be the rela tive importance of energy and non-energy solutions in these 
scenarios? What will be the role of amongst others nuclear power and clean-
fossil technologies? Are clean-fossil technologies and other idetified solutions to 
be seen as an interim or final solution? 
f) What will be the benefits of the identified policies and instruments for other en-
vironmental goals? (For example, reducing deforestation is good for water ma n-
agement, combating soil erosion, dealing with loss of biodiversity etc.) 
g) Which of the four scenarios do you see as likely and why?  
h) Which climate change (related) policy options are likely to take place irrespec-
tive of the scenarios? 
i) What climate change (related) domestic measures can be taken irrespective of 
agreement at EU and international level? 
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j) What climate change (related) domestic measures can only be taken on the basis 
of international agreement? 
k) Which policy options can be promoted without risking national economic growth 
under all four scenarios? 
l) What are the possible packages of commitments for the second and following 
commitment periods for different groups of countries?  
m) What short-term policy options for promoting technological and institutional 
change at the national level are robust, feasible and compatible with the different 
scenarios of medium and long-term climate policy? 
n) What pace of GHG emission reduction do you expect in the future? What per-
centage of reduction can be achieved by what year? How will this correspond to 
atmospheric concentration levels of CO2 equivalents? 
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Director, Tata Energy Research Institute, India 
Vice Chair, IPCC 
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